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SUMMARY 
Worldwide, socioeconomic development has been very uneven. Alongside remarkable 
advances in human progress, there remain serious concerns of persistent poverty and 
heightened inequalities. The United Nations’ World Summit for Social Development, 
Copenhagen Declaration, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have all expressed, 
renewed commitment to help eradicate poverty and inequality. The scientific and research 
community have argued that providing effective social policies that evaluate the scale of 
poverty and inequality are imperative for understanding their societal impacts.  This 
dissertation focuses mainly on examining three empirical themes in the literature put into 
three manuscripts.   
The first chapter examined the impact of innovation and entrepreneurship on income 
inequality using longitudinal data from 2000 to 2016 for  middle-and low-income countries 
(64) and high income countries (25). Evidence from the literature have shown that 
entrepreneurship and innovation are primary drivers of income inequality, particularly in 
the “Global North”. Given the nature of entrepreneurship and the pace of technological 
progress in the “Global South” and the lack of research focus in the literature, we 
investigated if spatial spillovers  innovation and entrepreneurship impact income inequality 
in the same way they affect economic growth. We applied spatial panel regression models to 
address potential issues of spatial dependency among neighboring countries. Our findings 
show that entrepreneurship and innovation exhibit Tobler’s effect and their spillovers have 
direct impact on income inequality.  
The second chapter investigated if there is an institutional quality threshold effect on 
income distributions. In the literature, scholars have argued on institutional quality as a tool 
for socioeconomic development, but one question that comes into play, is how much 
institutional change is necessary and if it is indeed possible to identify a specific threshold 
level. Since institutional quality is fragile and varies across the world, we compare the level 
in developing countries with that of the developed world by employing a dynamic panel 
threshold model by Kremer et al., (2013) on longitudinal data from 1995 to 2017. We estimate 
the threshold and marginal impact for institutional quality and compare tresults on different 
measures of institutions. Our findings suggest that institutional quality and income 
inequality relationship varies with the measure of institutional quality. More specifically, we 
find two pronged results (i) For World Governance Indicators (WBGI) proxy, we find 
quadratic effect for advanced countries, but a monotonic negative effect for developing 
countries; (ii) For ICRG-based measure of institutional quality, we find a Kuznets inverted 
Ushaped relationship between institutions and income inequality for both advanced and 
developing countries. The results also show a higher threshold value for developing 
countries compared to advanced economies. The effect of the individual institutional 
indicators show that government effectiveness has strong effect on income inequality in 
developing countries while rule of law is important when it comes to the relationship 
between institutional quality and income inequality in advanced countries.   
The third chapter investigated the effect of financial development on poverty 
reduction in developing economies by assessing the sensitivity of financial development to 
the choice of financial development and poverty indicators. This is important for the finance-
poverty literature considering the exclusion of non-formal financial institutions such as 
microfinance institutions from the measure of financial development. Tests based on a fixed 
effects 2SLS and dynamic panel estimation were used on a panel data of 49 developing 
countries from 2000 to 2017. We found significant support for the role of microfinance 
institutions on poverty reduction, while commercial banks do not induce non-monetary 
based poverty reduction. The multidimensional poverty index confirms the sensitivity of the 
effect of the choice of a financial development proxy. Further evidence using the social 
performance indicators of microfinance institutions revealed that only access to finance has 
poverty reducing effect.  
The following policy implications were deduced from the study. 
1. Middle-and low-income countries should continue to explore/pursue inclusive 
technological advancements that have potential to promote productivity and 
economic growth in the long run. This said, technology sharing policies can be 
adopted to reduce the impact of market dominance or monopoly power attributed to 
intellectual property rights enforceability. This can help eliminate some of the societal 
injustices (income inequality) that have saddled technological advancement in the 
advanced countries. 
2. To foster strong business and innovative economy, better institutional environment 
will be needed. Institutional framework poised toward zero tolerance for corruption, 
clientelism and favoritism can improve both the accessibility and use of needed 
resources to boost enterprise creation and hence, provide attractive job opportunities 
to move people out of poverty.  
3. One possible solution to increase entrepreneurial activities while reducing inequality 
is for governments in developing countries to offer various schemes targeting the 
poor, especially preferential financing. Finance is a key ingredient that smoothen the 
wheels of production. As such providing accessibility to both small and medium 
enterprise alike could reduce the burden of poverty among the less privileged of the 
society who have entrepreneurial intentions. A look at the social performance policy 
of the microfinance institutions revealed that only access to finance, have strong 
poverty reducing impact. This said, tax holidays can be used to motivate both 
commercial and microfinance institutions to increase their outreach in poverty zones. 
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CHAPTER 1  
  
Spillover effects of innovation and entrepreneurship on income inequality in developing countries: a 
spatial panel approach  
  
  
CHAPTER 1: SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURIAL 




Sustained economic growth remains a critical pathway out of poverty and a core driver of 
economic development. Yet, evidence show that it is not enough as an impetus for equal wealth 
distribution. The World Inequality Report in 2018 showed a marked rise in the Gini coefficient, 
income inequality, by more than 10% during the past two to three decades. Incomes of the top 
10% in Middle East accounted for 61% of the share of national income; 55% in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and 37% in Europe (Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2018). This trend in income 
inequality has persisted alongside global trend in economic growth (Alvaredo et al., 2018; Piketty, 
2015). Based on these facts, enterprise creation and technical change, key drivers of economic 
growth, have generally been accused to have induced societal injustices of inequality and 
heightened poverty, as an outgrowth of the capitalist system (Piketty, 2015). Some evidence 
further suggests that efficiency in innovation have promoted entrepreneurial successes and wage 
polarization at a much larger scale than before and therefore produced larger swings in the 
distribution of income (Frey & Osborne, 2017; Packard & Bylund, 2018). Yet nowadays, there is 
general support for innovation and entrepreneurship. Governments and policy experts across the 
world are focused on promoting enterprise creation and technological innovation in order to 
achieve profitable growth. In this context, innovation and entrepreneurship are considered as 
agents of change, but not drivers of income inequality, the reward to technological advancement 
and risk-taking (entrepreneurship). Innovation and entrepreneurship drive productivity, and in 
turn, productivity drives the flows of real income (Aghion, Akcigit, Bergeaud, Blundell, & 
Hemous, 2019; Frey & Osborne, 2017; Halvarsson, Korpi, & Wennberg, 2018; Piketty, 2015). While 
economist demonstrate the relevance of innovation as key element of economic progress, it is also 
imperative to stress the importance of the person who introduces innovation into the production 
process. This is because someone has to bear the risk of making a decision to incorporate an 
innovation in the firm. This person is the entrepreneur, and his activity has a positive effect on 
income distribution. The incentive to engage in enterprise creation is expected to be influenced 
by an array of factors that may inform the intentions, motivation and actions of an entrepreneur. 
The paramount of which is profit maximization, which has been argued to produce large swings 
in the incomes of entrepreneurs (Acs, Braunerhjelm, Audretsch, & Carlsson, 2009). While for 
many years, scholars have almost uncritically (save for few) considered innovation and 
entrepreneurship as means to economic growth, it is only in recent times evidence has shown 
entrepreneurship and innovation can under certain conditions exacerbate societal injustice, by 
creating imbalances in income distribution (income inequality) and deepen poverty (Cozzens & 
Kaplinsky, 2009; Cozzens et al., 2010; Piketty, 2015).  
In this study, we investigate the effect of entrepreneurial activities and innovation on 
income inequality and attempt to unravel how potential spillovers may impact the distribution 
of income in middle- and low-income countries. In this regard, we address the following 
hypotheses.  
(1) High entrepreneurial activities increase income inequality. 
(2) High rate of innovation increases income inequality.  
(3) Spillovers increase income inequality. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the impacts of innovation and entrepreneurial activities on  income 
inequality might vary with different settings of institutional quality. Particularly, given the lag in 
the institutional environment of middle- and low-income countries, we contend that profit 
maximizing entrepreneurs will support mechanisms that restrict market entry but promote rent-
seeking activities. Entrepreneurs with foreign partners will require strong institutions to avoid 
risk or expropriation or imitation of their innovation by other entities. Thus, maintaining market 
dominance to create wealth. In this regard, we further test if institutional quality plays an 
important role in governing such relationship. Spillovers from these effects could influence 
income inequality in other countries given the rise in globalization of  firms and regional 
agglomerations (Tobler, 1970). Considering the presence of spatial dependence, we distinguish 
our paper from prior studies by using spatial panel models to address the issues of spatial 
autocorrelation and unknown heterogeneity when using country-level data. 
The rest of the study proceeds as follows: a review of related literature in section 2 and a 
discussion of methodology in section 3. In section 4, we present our data analysis and discussion, 
and finally, section 5 concludes. 
1.2 Review of related literature  
1.2.1 Innovation and income inequality nexus 
The concept of innovation is not new in economics. Innovation is the process of creating new 
technologies and using them in the economy. Economists usually use broad definition of 
technology, so when they are talking about innovation, economists are not just thinking about 
new machines or inventions, but also new ways of doing things (including knowledge). When 
the classical economists described market behavior and mechanical advances in economic 
growth, they meant innovation (Galindo & Méndez-Picazo, 2013). These idiosyncratic 
attributions were however conceptualized to suit the purpose of their studies, thus leading to a 
wide range of definitions. From modern economic perspective, technological diffusion and the 
catch-up process (innovation) were the main drivers of growth (Aghion & Howitt, 1998; Lucas, 
1988; Romer, 1990). A large body of empirical work has evolved from this focus on technological 
progress and innovation. These studies have established that the level of innovation is a “sine 
qua non” for economic performance, particularly at the firm and industry level. These can either 
be product innovation or process innovation (Bloch, 2007). In developing countries, evidence 
show that most firms simply imitate or adapt existing production techniques (Unctad, 2007). This 
is because policies that attract foreign innovation to developing countries do not make it easily 
available for capture. And as such multinational firms have incentives to engage in technology 
transfers only if they do not face high risk of expropriation (Mansfield & Romeo, 1980). Evidence 
from Branstetter (2006) also show that technology transfers to developing countries only increase 
with the quality of intellectual property rights. The decision of foreign firms between licensing a 
technology and establishing a subsidiary through FDI depends heavily on the capacity of the host 
country to demonstrate that if the technology is licensed, it will not be easily copied through 
industrial espionage or worker turnover. Also, firms importing improved technology to 
incorporate into their production processes may not make it available domestically due to 
licensing issues or quest for market dominance (Grossman & Helpman, 1991). In this sense, 
importing firms will be more innovative than those who source from domestic market (Keller, 
2004). Several studies have investigated their implication on growth, but the same conclusion, 
however, cannot be drawn for income inequality because economic growth and income 
inequality are two different concepts. Researchers have not treated innovation and income 
inequality in great detail, and thus, deserves attention in the context of middle-and low-income 
countries.  
Prior studies including Aghion et al, (2019), Antonelli & Gehringer, (2017), Breau et al., 
(2014), Lee & Rodríguez-Pose, (2013), Acemoglu & Autor, (2011) and Lee, (2011) examined the 
innovation-inequality debate and concluded that intellectual property rights, skilled-biased 
technological changes, and capital gains (mark-up) are some of the drivers of modern day income 
inequality. In the spirit of Schumpeterian growth model, Aghion et al. (2019) examined the 
linkage between innovation, top-income inequality and social mobility in the U.S.. The authors 
showed that innovation (measured with patents and citations) contributes positively to top 
income inequality, but not to broad measures of inequality. They found that the correlation 
between entrant innovation and top income inequality is lower in states with higher lobbying 
intensity. Antonelli & Gehringer (2017) investigated the role of technological change on the levels 
of income inequality in 36 OECD countries over the period 1996 – 2011. Breau et al. (2014) 
employed census data of Canada over the period 1996 – 2006 to examine the relationship between 
innovation and wage inequality among Canadian cities. Their findings revealed a positive effect 
of innovation on inequality after controlling for other possible factors that may determine income 
inequality. Lee (2011) also assessed the innovation-inequality nexus across a panel of European 
economies from the European Community Household Panel and the Eurostat Regio database 
over the period 1996 - 2001. Using fixed-effect regression methods, the author showed a positive 
effect of innovation on income inequality. Lee further revealed that the nexus was robust when 
patent count is used as a measure of innovation. Buttressing these results, Lee & Rodríguez-pose 
(2013) also confirmed a positive innovation-inequality association in Europe after extending the 
analysis to other 80 U.S. cities, using microdata from the IPUMS Current Population Survey. 
Evidence of less-flexible labor market conditions and lower levels of migration were seen to drive 
the nexus between innovation and inequality in Europe than in the U.S. Rodríguez-Pose & 
Crescenzi (2008) analyzed the link between investment in R&D, patents, and economic growth in 
Europe. They found that R&D investment is more conducive to economic growth because of its 
impact on performance in both local and neighboring regions. In the case of developing countries, 
Adams (2008) investigated the effects of globalization and intellectual property rights on income 
inequality for 62 developing countries from 1985 – 2001 using seemingly unrelated regression. 
The findings demonstrated that strengthening patent protection indeed impacted positively on 
income inequality. Seo et al. (2020) tested the impact of income inequality on growth of 43 
countries from 1991 to 2014 using 3SLS regression. They found negative relationship between 
inequality and investment but did not find correlation between technological innovation and 
income inequality. Zhang & Zhang (2015) investigated the role of innovation on income 
inequality in China using instrument variable regression on longitudinal data from 1995 to 2011. 
The authors found U-shaped relationship between innovation and the ratio of urban-rural 
income. They further revealed that large amounts of innovation may increase income inequality. 
Given that institutional quality and governance play an important role in economic development 
(Azman-Saini, Hook Law, & Azman-Saini, 2012), some degree of influence may govern the 
relationship between innovation and income inequality. Innovators may prefer send their 
innovations to countries where their inventions will be safeguarded. 
 
1.2.2 Entrepreneurship and income inequality nexus 
Entrepreneurship as a concept has been defined and conceptualized in different ways. Various 
scholars have often adopted different definitions and conceptualizations that suit the purpose of 
their studies, thus leading to a wide range of definitions. While some envisage entrepreneurship 
as a transforming process turning innovative ideas into an enterprise and/or managing the 
enterprise to create value, others are of the view that entrepreneurship entails the risk bearing 
decisions about coordination of scarce resources (Casson, 2003). From Schumpeter’s perspective, 
entrepreneurship is the foundation for the commencement of innovative activity and the creation 
of new products to market. According to Kirzner, entrepreneurship consists of competitive 
behaviours that drive market process. This includes the introduction of new economic activity. 
Such entrepreneurship is manifested not only by market entry of new firms, but also by 
innovative and imitative entries into new markets by established firms. As noted in Wong et al. 
(2005), innovation is in fact one aspect of entrepreneurship, that of innovative entry. Another 
aspect of entrepreneurship is the new firm entry or new business creation. In spite of the 
numerous conflicting views characterizing the definition and conceptualization of 
entrepreneurship, scholars have begun to re-examine how the decisions of profit-maximizing 
agents (entrepreneurs) influence the impact of technological advancement on both growth and 
income inequality. The latest class of empirical models which conceptualized the issue of 
entrepreneurship, along the lines of Schumpeterian growth model, rose from the works of 
(Aghion & Howitt, 1998; Romer, 1990). In the entrepreneurship literature, Schumpeterian theories 
show the importance of entrepreneurial skills in economic transformation, and how an increase 
in the number of entrepreneurs leads to economic growth. These theories have led to a 
differentiation between entrepreneurs stemming out of the lack of opportunities, and 
“Schumpeterian” entrepreneurs who exploit some latent market opportunities (Stephens, 
Partridge, & Faggian, 2013). Acs (2006) examined that “entrepreneurship of necessity” may not 
necessarily translate into long-term economic growth compared to “entrepreneurship of 
opportunity”. Evidence from Stephens & Partridge (2011) showed stronger effects for 
opportunity entrepreneurship; they found that all forms of business creation are also associated 
with faster Appalachian job growth. Scholars such as Lippmann et al. (2015) show that high-
income inequality occurs when majority of the population is found in the lower income spectrum 
and, as such, necessity entrepreneurship becomes the only means for low-income individuals to 
maintain a certain level of wellbeing. Others, also demonstrated that positive returns that the rich 
receive from their investments in entrepreneurial activities further worsen the income gap 
between high-and-low income earners, creating vicious cycle of wealth concentration at the top 
and poverty at the bottom of the income distribution (Alvaredo et al. 2017; Piketty, 2015). Based 
on Schumpeterian growth theory, Aghion et al. (2019) proposed an economic model that assumes 
that national income is divided between workers and entrepreneurs. The authors demonstrated 
that in some economic sectors, such as the high-technological ones where capital gains (mark-up) 
exist, entrepreneurs and business leaders earn the largest share of the capital gains that accrue to 
the firms (Benos & Tsiachtsiras, 2019) and this top income share increases when it is owned by all 
the entrepreneurs who have innovated successfully. Stephens et al. (2013) showed that regardless 
of the source, new business creation has three general effects on the economy: (i) the direct effect 
of creating jobs, (ii) the displacement effect (new businesses take jobs away from existing 
businesses; and (iii) the indirect (or spillover) effects on other businesses (Fritsch & Mueller, 2004). 
The direct and indirect effects should increase total employment and the displacement effects 
should lower total employment. Self-employment may have greater direct employment and 
income distributive effects due to its more labor-intensive production. The indirect effects include 
the “multiplier” effects caused by creation of subsidiary firms across countries. Likewise, 
intangible spillovers can arise when knowledge or business model created by one business “spills 
over” into the immediate geographic region (Puga, 2010). In examining the impacts of 
entrepreneurs, it is important to recognize that because the indirect effects may take time to 
materialize, the full effects from entrepreneurial development may only be realized over the 
longer term.  
 Empirically, studies including (Cagetti & Nardi, 2006; Halvarsson et al., 2018; Lewellyn, 
2018; Lippmann et al., 2015; Ragoubi & El Harbi, 2018) have examined the entrepreneurship – 
inequality linkages. They find that high entrepreneurial activity is associated with upward social 
mobility (Bruton, Ketchen, & Ireland, 2013; Halvarsson et al., 2018). Aligned with this view is that 
entrepreneurship leads to job creation for those at the bottom of the income distribution 
(Hathaway, Bell-Masterson, & Stangler, 2013; Stangler & Litan, 2009). Thus, job-creating 
entrepreneurial activities that enhance opportunities for those at the bottom of the distribution to 
increase their income and thereby increasing the level of income dispersion. Despite this, others 
are of the view that the ‘rich’ people possess incentive mechanisms that limit access to resources 
that engenders income redistribution (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Stiglitz, 2012) and therefore 
increasing inequality at the expense of social mobility for the disenfranchised. Employing data 
from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Lippmann et al., (2015) examined the relationship 
between workforce income inequality and the rate of entrepreneurship. The authors found higher 
rates of entrepreneurship among economies with high income inequality. Their evidence was 
suggestive of the fact that structural factors, including the level of economic development, 
government policies, foreign direct investment, service sector growth, increasing labor market 
flexibility, wealth-transfer programs and variation in worker unionization have a significant 
influence on the entrepreneurship-income inequality relationship. Employing a system GMM 
model with U.S. state-level data, Atems & Shand (2018) examined the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and income inequality for the period from 1989 to 2013. Their findings showed 
a positive relationship between entrepreneurship and income inequality. In a fuzzy-set 
qualitative comparative analysis, Lewellyn (2018) found a positive association between income 
inequality and the high presence of high-growth (opportunity) and necessity entrepreneurship1. 
Deutsch & Silber (2004) found that income inequality only increased with a rise in labor income 
share and declined with a fall in the share of entrepreneurial income, revealing a positive 
relationship between entrepreneurial income and income inequality. Aligned with this argument, 
Quadrini (2000) shows that entrepreneurship leads to a larger concentration of wealth due to a 
higher savings rate of entrepreneurs. In terms of low-and-middle income countries, (Ragoubi & 
El Harbi, 2018) examined entrepreneurship and income inequality dynamics, using spatial panel 
data analysis for 33 high-income countries and 39 middle and low-income countries over the 
period from 2004 to 2014. They found strong support for the negative spillover effect of income 
inequality on entrepreneurial activity in developing economies. Kimhi (2010) analyzed the 
impact of entrepreneurship on household income inequality in southern Ethiopia using 
inequality decomposition technique. The findings showed a decreasing effect of entrepreneurial 
income (income from self-employment) on household income inequality. However, this study 
fails to account for the spatial effect of entrepreneurship on household income inequality. 
Employing a two-stage least squares regression, Berkowitz & Jackson, (2006) also show that 
higher rates of entry of new enterprises led to a more equitable distribution of income in Russia 
and Poland. Mohamad et al. (2021) examine the role of entrepreneurship on income inequality in 
developing countries using a sample of 47 countries over the period 2009 – 2017. Results from the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) show that increasing the level of entrepreneurship may 
decrease income inequality.  
                                                          
1 Opportunity entrepreneur is defined to include individuals who start businesses to exploit a potential opportunity 
to increase their income and are mostly associated with more growth-oriented businesses. Necessity entrepreneurs, on 
the other hand, are individuals who are pushed into entrepreneurship out of necessity or seek only to maintain their 
income (Bosma & Kelley, 2019). 
1.3 Research Method 
1.3.1 Data Sources 
In this paper, we test the hypotheses for two groups of countries. The list of countries is based on 
income. We employ World Bank 2020 country classifications2. Due to the low number of low-
income countries, we merged middle-and low-income countries to form one set of countries 
called the middle-and low-income countries and high-income countries. The justification of these 
categorization is based on socioeconomic and political differences, hence eliminating to some 
extent the level of heterogeneity that otherwise might influence the models (see Ragoubi & El 
Harbi, 2018). Thus, the middle-and low-income countries are 64 and high-income countries are 
25. We use annual macroeconomic data covering the period 2000 – 2016. The limiting constraints 
to our sample size was the availability of reliable data on the various indicators for the period of 
analysis, specifically income inequality, entrepreneurship indicator and innovation. Our 
dependent variable is the Gini coefficient of disposable income, which measures the degree of 
within-country income inequality. The Gini coefficient of disposable income ranges between 0 
and 100, with a value of hundred expressing maximum concentration of income, and zero, 
implying egalitarian distribution of income. The income inequality indicator is obtained from the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID v8.3). We control for the effect of real 
income (GDP per capita) and trade openness, all extracted from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI). We also control for institutional quality which is derived from the World Bank 
Governance Indicators (WBGI).  
                                                          
2 See Appendix 1. 2 for list of countries. 
A key variable in this paper is the innovation. This indicator has been measured in prior 
studies using different indicators including patent count, research and development (R&D) as a 
share of GDP, product and process innovation, total factor productivity, and innovation in 
exports. In this study, we use patent applications based on equivalized counts. Statistics on the 
patent applications are extracted from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 
Another relevant variable considered in this paper is entrepreneurship. Various scholars in the 
entrepreneurship literature have used unique indicators, including self-employment (Atems & 
Shand, 2018; Halvarsson et al., 2018; Kimhi, 2010; Stephens & Partridge, 2011; Stephens et al., 
2013), the number of new business density (Ragoubi & El Harbi, 2018), total entrepreneurship 
activities (TEA) from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Galindo & Méndez-Picazo, 2013; 
Wennekers & Thurik, 1999; Wong et al., 2005) the data for TEA is limited particularly in the case 
of middle-and-low income countries, only 60 countries across the world are sampled for this 
survey. This inappropriate for this study due to the absence of contiguity among some of the 
countries covered. Similarly, the new business density which measures formal entrepreneurship 
is also limited in scope (both time and number of countries). Self-employment, although may not 
connote modern day definition of entrepreneurship but is the most widely available proxy for all 
countries. It must be noted that though self-employment data can be used across countries when 
collected from standardized sources, it is arguably not an appropriate measure of (actual) formal 
entrepreneurship (see Desai, 2011) but rather a good proxy for entrepreneurial activity 
(Wennekers & Thurik, 1999) as such can be interpreted to some extent as a measure of 
entrepreneurial potential. For brevity, we dwell on self-employment as a measure of 
entrepreneurial activity in this study and use the new business density data for sensitivity 
analysis. See Appendix 1. 1 for summary of variables description. 
1.3.2 Econometric Model 
To test our hypotheses, we use a neo-classical growth model based on a variant of the Cobb–
Douglas production function with constant return to scale (see Wong et al., 2005). Entrepreneurial 
activity and innovation are entered explicitly as exogenous determinants of income, representing 
two aspects of entrepreneurial activities. In this formulation, new firm creation and innovation 
may be considered as augmenting factors of production, with innovation representing 
knowledge capital and new firm creation representing a form of entrepreneurial capital. The 
Cobb Douglas production function for cross section is derived as follows: 
𝑌 = 𝐴0𝐾𝛼𝐿𝛽 (1) 
where 𝑌 = output or income; 𝐴0 = disembodied factor productivity; 𝐾 = stock of physical capital 
and 𝐿 = labor employed. 
𝑦 = 𝐴0𝐾𝛼𝐿𝛽−1 (2) 











Assuming Constant Returns to Scale,  𝛼 + 𝛽 − 1. Hence 







Taking natural logs on both sides: 





We assume the growth in disembodied factor productivity, 𝐴0 , to be explained by stock of 
knowledge capital (innovation) and entrepreneurial activity: 
ln 𝐴0 = 𝛽0 + 𝜙𝑃𝐶𝑇 + 𝜆𝐸𝑁𝑇, (6) 
where β0 = constant; Innov = innovation index measuring innovation; ENT = self-employment 
rate measuring entrepreneurial activity. Substituting (6) into (5): 





We control for real income, government spending and institutional quality in the (7). The generic 
form of regression model used is; 
ln 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝜙𝑃𝐶𝑇 + 𝜆𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛼 ln (
𝐾
𝐿
) + 𝛿 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶) + 𝛾 ln(𝑂𝑃𝑁) + 𝜃 ln(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑄) 
(8) 
To examine the moderating role of institutional quality with both innovation and entrepreneurial 
activity in influencing income inequality, we extend (8) to include the interaction term. The new 
model is specified as follows:  
ln 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝜙𝐼𝑃𝐶𝑇 + 𝜆𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛼 ln (
𝐾
𝐿
) + 𝛿 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶) + 𝛾 ln(𝑂𝑃𝑁) + 𝜃𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑞
+  𝜏(𝑃𝐶𝑇 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇) + ℶ(𝐸𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇) 
(9) 
Real income is included in the model because it has been demonstrated empirically to have 
moderating effect on income inequality (Law, Naseem, Lau & Trinugroho, 2020). Institutional 
quality is included because better institutions tend to reduce income inequality (Chong & 
Gradstein, 2007; Lin & Fu, 2016) and better institution motivate profit maximizing entrepreneurs 
to innovate (Keller, 2004). Trade openness is also controlled because it has been found to influence 
income inequality particularly in middle and low income countries following the Stopler and 
Samuelson’s theorem of international trade (Mazur, 2000). 
1.3.3 Methodological Approach 
In this study, we adopt the spatial panel regression model to test our hypotheses. The spatial 
model addresses data with spatial dependence and temporal heterogeneity. In this paper, three 
of the spatial panel specifications would be considered. The spatial lag model (SAR), spatial error 
model (SEM) and the spatial Durbin model (SDM). The SAR model is of the form: 
𝑦 = 𝜌(𝐼𝑇⨂𝑊𝑁)𝑦 + 𝑋𝛽 + (𝜄𝑇⨂𝐼𝑁)𝜇 + (𝐼𝑇⨂𝜄𝑁)𝜂 + 𝑢 (10) 
 
where 𝜌 is the SAR coefficient. where y is an (NT×1) vector of observations on the dependent 
variable; X is an (NT×k) matrix of observations on the non-stochastic exogenous regressors. 𝜄𝑇 
denotes a (T×1) column vector of ones of length T. The coefficient μ denotes the individual effect 
(or heterogeneity) for each country, and η denotes the time-period effect. 𝜄𝑁  denotes a (N×1) 
column vector of ones of length N. 𝐼𝑁  denotes an (N×N) identity matrix, and 𝐼𝑇  is an identity 
matrix of dimensions (T×T). ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. Since we are dealing with a spatial 
panel, the weights are extended to the entire panel as follows: 
𝑊𝑁𝑇 = (𝐼𝑇⨂𝑊𝑁) (11) 
 
where 𝐼𝑇 denotes an (T × T) identity matrix, ⊗ is the Kronecker product, and 𝑊𝑁 is an (N × N) 
positive non-stochastic cross-sectional spatial weighting matrix whose diagonal elements are set 
to zero. Following the general convention, the weights 𝑊𝑖𝑗  are standardized so that each row of 
the matrix 𝑊𝑁 sums to unity. The SEM is also expressed as follows: 
𝑦 = 𝑋𝛽 + (𝜄𝑇⨂𝐼𝑁)𝜇 + (𝐼𝑇⨂𝜄𝑁)𝜂 + 𝑢 
𝑢 = 𝜆(𝜄𝑇⨂𝐼𝑁)𝑢 +  
(12) 
where 𝑢 reflects the spatially autocorrelated error term and 𝜆 denotes the coefficient on the 
error term. The SDM model extends the SAR/SEM model with spatially lagged independent 
variables, and is specified as follows: 
𝑦 = 𝛿(𝐼𝑇⨂𝑊𝑁)𝑦 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝛾(𝐼𝑇⨂𝑊𝑁)𝑋 + (𝜄𝑇⨂𝐼𝑁)𝜇 + (𝐼𝑇⨂𝜄𝑁)𝜂 + 𝑢 (13) 
 
where the parameters are the same as before but the parameter γ denotes a coefficient on the 
explanatory variables. 
The SDM model can be used to check if the model is nested in a SAR model or a SEM 
model since the models nesting depends on both the disturbances and the dependent variable 
(LeSage & Pace, 2009; Elhorst, 2014). Then, this model can be used to test the hypotheses H0 :γ = 0 
and H0 :γ + δβ = 0. The first hypothesis examines whether the SDM model is nested in the SAR 
model, and the second hypothesis whether it is nested in the SEM model. Both tests follow a chi-
square distribution with K degrees of freedom. If the SAR and the SEM models are estimated 
separately, these tests can take the form of a likelihood ratio (LR) test in order to determine which 
model provides the best fit for the data (Elhorst 2014). If these models are not estimated, the LR 
tests can also be complemented with Wald tests. It must be noted that if both hypotheses H0: γ = 0 
and H0 :γ + δβ = 0 are rejected, then the SDM model best describes the data. On the contrary, if 
the first hypothesis cannot be rejected, then the SAR model best describes the data, provided that 
the (robust) LM tests also pointed to the SAR model. Likewise, if the second hypothesis cannot 
be rejected, then the SEM model best describes the data, provided that the (robust) LM tests also 
pointed to the SEM model. Elhorst (2014) argue that if one of these conditions is not satisfied, that 
is, if the (robust) LM tests point to another model than the Wald/LR tests, then the SDM model 
should be adopted. This is because this model generalizes both the SAR model and the SEM 
model. 
1.4 Empirical results and discussions 
Here, we present the empirical results. Table 1. 1 reports a summary of the descriptive statistics 
of the variables. We report mean self-employment rate of 14.94% of total employment for high 
income countries and 24.20% for the middle-and low-income countries. Particularly, the results 
show higher percentage of self-employment activities in the middle-and low-income countries 
than seen in the high-income countries. This is supported by the mean of employers in high 
income countries to that in the middle-and low-income countries. Also, we find that on the 
average the percentage of own-account workers are higher in middle and low-income countries 
than we see in high income countries.  
Table 1. 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 High-income countries Middle-and low-income countries 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Self-employment 425 14.94 6.61 6.39 46.11 1,088 54.44 24.20 4.06 94.66 
Employer 425 4.00 1.36 1.04 7.49 1,088 2.98 2.62 0.21 17.88 
Own-account 425 9.26 4.32 2.24 24.58 1,088 35.68 18.02 2.07 88.52 
Entry rate 425 2.14 0.68 0.45 3.66 1,088 0.73 0.72 0.21 3.09 
Government spending 425 19.71 3.26 10.91 27.94 1,088 13.77 4.27 0.95 28.01 
Gini coefficient 425 29.17 3.85 22.60 38.50 1,088 42.22 7.78 23.00 66.90 
GDP per capita 425 38,007.37 24,310.01 4,899.18 111,968.40 1,088 3,462.66 3,104.16 194.87 14,920.45 
Institutional quality 425 3.14 1.26 -0.48 5.11 1,088 -1.36 1.15 -4.87 1.25 
Innovation 425 33146.89 85322.46 19.00 530659 1,088 6919.43 64888.63 0.00 1257425.0 
Capital per worker 425 0.35 0.17 0.05 0.95 1,088 0.07 0.06 0.002 0.30 
Source: authors computation 
For new business density (entry rate), we report a mean value of 2.14 for high income countries 
and a mean of 0.73 for middle and low-income countries. In this regard, we hypothesize that 
lower rate of self-employment signifies a higher entrepreneurship while higher values of self-
employment denote a lower level of entrepreneurship. In line with prior studies (Halvarsson et 
al., 2018),we expect that a higher proportion of self-employed increases income dispersion, while 
lower self-employed in the workforce contribute to income dispersion at the top end of the 
distribution. This is in line with Desai (2011) that suggest a strong small business sector and 
entrepreneurship are generally linked to a strong economy. On income inequality, the Gini 
coefficient of disposable income show high inequality for middle-and low-income countries, 
recording a mean of 42.22. The results show a minimum and maximum of Gini coefficient of 23.00 
and 66.90, respectively. For high income countries, the Gini coefficient of income inequality 
shows a mean of 29.17 with a minimum (maximum) of 22.60 (38.50).  Figure 1. 1 shows the plot 
of the Gini coefficient of disposable income.  This shows the pattern of income inequality in both 
the high income and the middle and low-income countries. 
 
Figure 1. 1: Plot of average Gini coefficient of disposable, 2000 – 2016 
 
In terms of innovation, we record a mean of 0.56 for high income countries and a mean of -0.19 
for middle- and low-income countries. For capital per worker, we report mean of 0.35 for high 
income countries and 0.07 for middle- and low-income countries. Also, we find higher GDP per 
capita in high income countries (US$ 38,007.37) compared to a mean of US$ 3,462.66 for the 
middle- and low-income countries. Similar, we find higher government spending (measured by 
government final consumption expenditure) 19.71% in high income countries and 13.77% in 
middle- and low-income countries. We report a mean of 3.14 (-1.36) for high income countries 
(middle- and low-income countries) for institutional quality. Figure 1. 2Errore. L'origine 
riferimento non è stata trovata. shows the scatterplot of Gini coefficient of income inequality and 
innovation, and with self-employment.  
Table 1. 2 presents the results of the non-spatial regression based on pooled OLS. The estimated 
coefficients on self-employment (lnSELF) conform with expectations. Specifically, we find 
evidence of positive relationship between self-employment and income inequality for middle-
and low-income countries. 
  
Figure 1. 2: Scatterplot of Gini and Innovation Figure 1. 3: Scatterplot of Gini and Self-
employment. 
 
But negative relationship for high-income countries. Also, for middle- and low-income countries, 
coefficients of innovation (lnPCT) are all negative suggesting low levels of innovation reduces 
income inequality. For high income countries, the coefficient shows negative innovation-
inequality nexus. Except the relationship between innovation and income inequality for high 
income countries, all the other findings are in line with our expectations. The coefficient on real 
income is consistent with prior studies (see Dulani, Mattes, & Logan, 2013). The negative 
relationship between trade openness (lnOPN) and income inequality is in line with the Stolper–
Samuelson theorem (Esquivel & Rodrıguez-López, 2003) but contrary to (Bergh & Nilsson, 2010; 
Mazur, 2000). The coefficients on institutional quality and its interactive terms also conform with 
general expectation of the behavior of institutions in both high income and middle-and-low 
income countries. The Moran’s I which is the correlation between income inequality in the focal 
country and that of its neighbors is positive and significant at 1% level. This shows the presence 
of strong spatial dependence, implying that countries with similar income distribution (high or 
low) tend to be concentrated geographically. 
 
Figure 1. 4: Moran’s I plot of average Gini coefficient of disposable, 2000 - 2016. 
 
Figure 1. 4, illustrate the graphical representation of the Moran I test. Due to the presence of 
spatial autocorrelation, the non-spatial panel model may suffer from misspecification if spatial 
dependence exists within the data.  From policy standpoint, the results of the non-spatial model 
may lead policy makers to believe that adopting a particular policy stands, such as encouraging 
both innovation and entrepreneurship, will result in higher economic growth but at the expense 
of inequality. 
Table 1. 2: Results of non-spatial panel model  













































































































Observation 1513 425 1088 1513 425 1088 
R-squared 0.5297 0.4449 0.4039 0.5104 0.4099 0.3654 
AIC -1200.7194 -761.1573 -1134.0707 -1143.8625 -739.1477 -1070.0264 
F- stat 261.6[0.000] 48.4[0.000] 103.8[0.000] 211.7[0.000] 41.68[0.000] 91.39[0.000] 
Moran I statistic 7.784[0.000] 8.572[0.000] 11.397[0.000] 9.074[0.000] 8.616[0.000] 9.851[0.000] 
LM spatial error 59.476[0.000] 69.753[0.000] 127.38[0.000] 80.767[0.000] 69.892[0.000] 94.819[0.000] 
LM spatial lag 41.185[0.000] 64.29[0.000] 90.148[0.000] 49.313[0.000] 73.183[0.000] 76.525[0.000] 
Robust LM spatial error 18.918[0.000] 8.548[0.003] 37.318[0.000] 31.563[0.000] 4.932[0.026] 19.462[0.000] 
Robust LM spatial lag 0.626[0.4287] 3.085[0.079] 0.084[0.773] 0.109[0.7406] 8.222[0.004] 1.1681[0.279] 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
  
We proceed to test for the presence of spatial dependence by conducting the classical Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) tests. These results are listed at the bottom of  
Table 1. 2. From the diagnostics, the results favor spatially autocorrelated error terms since we 
find consistent rejection of the hypothesis of no spatially autocorrelated error dependence except 
for column 6. Since the LM test is not enough to pick the best model, a further test using the LR 
tests are reported to find the appropriate specification. We estimate a spatial durbin model, 
reported in  
 
Table 1. 3. The LR test on the hypothesis whether spatial durbin model is nested in the spatial 
error model is rejected: overall sample (LR test: 85.569, p<0.01), high income countries (LR test: 
65.474, p<0.01) and middle- and low-income countries (LR test: 54.878, p<0.01). The first 
hypothesis (H0: γ = 0) could not be rejected, implying that spatial durbin model is the most 
appropriate specification. The test results indicate that the second hypothesis (H0 :γ + δβ = 0) 
could be also rejected, which implies that the SEM is not appropriate based on tests conducted 
on the overall sample. These LR tests pre-suggest that the SDM with an error component is most 
appropriate specification for this relationship.  
 
Table 1. 3: Results of Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) 
 Model without interaction Model with interaction 








































































































































































































































Observation  1513 425 1088 1513 425 1088 
R-squared 0.5431 0.5885 0.4590 0.5712 0.6154 0.4872 
Log Likelihood 623.6471 441.9769 610.9293 668.3151 456.0200 644.9055 
AIC [Spatial model] -1217.2941 -853.9538 -1191.8586 -1298.6301 -874.0401 -1251.8110 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
 
We now turn to the economic interpretation of the results based on the SDM model. All 
the values of (λ) are positive and statistically significant at the conventional level of 1%. An 
interpretation suggests that the pattern of income inequality in neighboring countries, averagely 
exert a positive effect on local income inequality. Since income inequality is estimated based on 
income/consumption across countries, this coefficient implies that economic distance across 
countries is affecting local income distribution or vice versa. Economic distance in the high-
income countries could potentially represent movement of wealth while that of the middle-and 
low-income countries could represent movement of food commodity (if income inequality is 
consumption-based approach). Note that coefficients of the SDM model do not directly reflect the 
marginal effects of the covariates (LeSage & Pace 2009), hence we interpret the results of the 
marginal effects presented in Table 1. 4.  
Table 1. 4: Marginal impact of innovation, self-employment and income inequality 
Model without interaction terms  
Model Overall Sample High income Middle-and low income 















































































































***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
‹ 
Model with interaction terms 
Model Overall Sample High income Middle-and low income 

















































































































































***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
 
The direct effect represents the impact due to changes in the regressors on the income inequality 
of the local country. The indirect effect is the impact attributed to the changes in the regressors of 
neighboring countries on the income inequality of the local country. The total effect is simply the 
aggregation of the direct and indirect effects. We can observe differences between the coefficients 
of the direct effect and the coefficients of the point estimates. The reason is the feedback effects 
that arise because of the impacts passing through neighboring countries and back to the countries 
themselves. These are due to the coefficients of the spatially lagged dependent variable and that 
of the spatially lagged independent regressors. Here, it must be noted that the estimation is based 
on the queen contiguity weight matrix.  
 In Table 1. 4, the marginal effects for the overall sample, high income countries and 
middle-and low-income countries are reported. For the overall sample, innovation has negative 
direct effect on income inequality, which is significant at 1% level. The indirect effect however 
shows positive spillover effect from neighboring countries. This is significant at 10% level. The 
total effect is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms of high-income 
countries, we find a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between innovation and 
income inequality. This means that there is no dependence between innovation and income 
inequality in these countries. The indirect effect is, however, negative, and significant at the 1% 
level. The total effect also shows negative relationship between innovation and income inequality 
but is statistically significant at 10%. For Middle and low-income countries, we find negative 
direct effect between innovation and income inequality. The indirect effect of innovation on the 
income inequality is positive. Both the direct and indirect effects are statistically significant at the 
1% level. The total effect shows a negative relationship between innovation and income 
inequality. This is significant at the 10% level.   
      We proceed to examine the relationship between self-employment and income inequality, the 
results for high income countries show negative effects. The negative spillover effect (indirect 
effect) shows that entrepreneurial activities from neighboring economies have negative effect on 
the focal country. This can be possible if the entrepreneurial activity is mainly driven by a strong 
business sector which is linked to job creation. However, it must be noted that the indirect effect 
may take time to materialize, the full effects from entrepreneurial development may only be 
realized over the longer term but mostly when factors that promote free movement of investment 
and doing business across borders are properly enforced (Puga, 2010). The results of Middle- and 
low-income countries show positive relationship between self-employment and income 
inequality, significant at the 1% level.  The results of the Middle and low-income countries are 
consistent with reviews of Desai (2011) and other studies (Atems & Shand, 2018; Cagetti & Nardi, 
2006; Halvarsson et al., 2018; Lewellyn, 2018), who also used self-employment as a measure of 
entrepreneurial activity. These studies attributed the positive nexus to the large informal nature 
of entrepreneurial activities in developing countries. The difference between the direct effect and 
the point estimates yields the feedback effect equal to 0.1549. The positive feedback effect shows 
that over time income inequality in the focal country will increase due to an increase in self-
employment.  
The results of the overall sample show positive dependence between self-employment 
and income inequality. We further investigated the indirect channels in the role of innovation, 
entrepreneurial activity, and income inequality by interacting with institutional quality given the 
level of heterogeneity between these income groupings. The results are presented in Table 4b. 
The relationship between innovation and income inequality, and self-employment and income 
inequality are qualitatively like our results in Table 1. 4. For the overall sample, we find that the 
direct effect for the interactive term between innovation and institutional quality is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that institutional quality influence innovation to reduce income 
inequality. The indirect effect is positive but not significant. The total effect also reiterates 
negative spatial dependence. The results for the high-income countries are positive but only 
statistically significant for the indirect effect and total effect. For the case of Middle and low-
income countries, the direct effect is negative and statistically significant. The indirect and total 
effects show no dependence. In terms of the interaction between self-employment and 
institutional quality, the direct effect shows positive relationship with income inequality for both 
the high-income countries and the overall sample. This shows that entrepreneurial activities in 
the high-income countries are correlated with income inequality. This may be due to 
displacement effect in which some businesses may take jobs away from others due to their 
newfound innovation or size. These newfound innovations are mainly supported by institutional 
mechanisms that give some level of autonomy (monopoly) to the inventors to make their profits 
before others can imitate. Contrarily, we find evidence of negative effect for middle- and low-
income countries. Since the motive for partaking in entrepreneurial activity differs from one 
person to another (Bosma & Kelley, 2019). We disentangle the self-employment into opportunity 
and necessity entrepreneurs. The opportunity entrepreneurs are those who start businesses to 
exploit a potential opportunity to increase their income and are mostly associated with more 
growth-oriented businesses. These group of individuals are associated with employers in the self-
employment classifications as they fulfil the entrepreneurial function of risk-bearing. The other 
group which is the own-account self-employed are like individuals who are pushed into 
entrepreneurial activities who seek only to maintain their income. This group is known as the 
necessity entrepreneurs. The panel SDM is reported in Table 1. 5 and the marginal impact in Table 
1. 6. We report only the marginal effects of the model with the interactive terms. 
For high income countries, the overall results of the direct effects of the coefficient for 
opportunity show negative effect but no dependence on income inequality. The indirect effect 
however, real presence of positive dependence between opportunity entrepreneurs in 
neighboring countries and income inequality of the focal country. This notwithstanding, we also 
find negative correlation between necessity and income inequality for the high-income countries. 
The coefficient is, however, high than the coefficient of opportunity entrepreneurship. For 
middle- and low-income countries, both the direct and indirect effects show positive dependence 
of opportunity entrepreneurship on income inequality. But the coefficient for necessity 
entrepreneurs shows otherwise, with the direct effect and indirect effect being positive. This 
relationship is not statistically significant. On the control variables, the coefficients of real income 
for middle- and low-income countries is positively correlated with income inequality. This result 
is consistent with the views of Dulani et al. (2013) suggesting that the impact of the high reported 
growth do not trickle down to the poorest citizens and as such may be worsening income 
inequality.
Table 1. 5: Results based on disaggregated self-employment, innovation and income inequality. 
 Opportunity-based self-employment[employers] Necessity-based self-employment [Own-account workers] 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Observation 1513 425 1088 1513 425 1088 1513 425 1088 1513 425 1088 
R-squared 0.5384 0.5830 0.4110 0.5597 0.6010 0.4211 0.5338 0.5821 0.4249 0.5645 0.6080 0.4548 
Log Likelihood 612.0121 437.0397 563.4231 644.2394 446.2904 575.8032 606.7721 437.4011 580.4693 654.6782 450.9095 613.2762 
AIC [Spatial model] -1194.0242 -844.0794 -1096.8462 -1250.4789 -854.5809 -1113.6064 -1183.5441 -844.8022 -1130.9387 -1271.3564 -863.8191 -1188.5524 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1       
 
Table 1. 6: Marginal impact of disaggregated self-employment, innovation and income inequality. 
Marginal impact of innovation, opportunity entrepreneurship on income inequality 
Model Overall Sample High income Middle-and low income 

















































































































































          
Marginal impact of innovation, necessity entrepreneurship on income inequality 
Model Overall Sample High income Middle-and low income 

















































































































































***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
As expected, we find negative relationship between real incomes of high-income 
countries and income inequality. Generally, we find positive relationship between institutional 
quality and income inequality for the middle- and low-income countries. This results is in line 
with Perera and Lee (2013) and Gyimah-Brempong and Camacho (2006). Although, positive 
relationship is not surprising, we investigate this relationship further in a more dynamic 
approach in chapter 2. The institutional quality and income inequality nexus are negative for high 
income countries. The negative nexus for high income countries corroborates evidence from 
Scully (1988), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), and Gwama 
(2014), who validated that countries with well-developed institutional mechanisms have the 
potential to foster reductions in income inequality. The findings for the middle and low income 
countries however, corroborates evidence of Dobson & Ramlogan (2010), Amendola et al. (2013), 
Perera & Lee (2013), Brunori et al. (2013), Hartmann et al. (2017) and Aiyar & Ebeke (2019), who 
found similar results in Latin America, Africa and among the Asian tigers. The positive 
relationship between institutional quality and inequality reiterates  that some institutional 
reformations in these economies may be misguided as argued by Andres & Ramlogan-Dobson 
(2011). Thus, institutional quality in these economies such as property rights, may preserve the 
interest of influential elites who can control key markets, access to investment opportunities, and 
enjoy disproportionate political influence via political clientelism. Also, contrary to Kaldor and 
Barro’s prediction of positive relationship between investment and inequality in developing 
countries, the result for capital per worker is significant and negative for middle- and low-income 
countries but positive for high income countries. It is worth noting that the coefficients of the 
SDM model do not directly reflect the marginal effects of the corresponding explanatory variables 
on the dependent variable.  
For sensitivity, we rerun the spatial durbin model with number of new businesses are the 
dependent variables. We replaced missing values with zeros, as a criterion of the spatial panel 
models, only balanced datasets are allowed. Countries with missing data (e.g OECD countries) 
were extracted from the dataset on birthrate of businesses. The results of the point estimates of 
the SDM are presented in Table 1. 7 and the marginal coefficients in Table 1. 8. Consistent with 
the results in Table 1.4, the relationship between innovation and income inequality are 
qualitatively similar for both high income and middle-and low-income countries. However, the 
difference only exists on the measure of entrepreneurship. When we use the new business density 
proxy of entrepreneurship (lnENTRY), we find the direct effect for high income countries is 
positive and the indirect effect is negative, both are statistically significant at 1%. The feedback 
effect for high income countries is negative 0.0125 for the model with contiguity matrix and 
negative 0.0131 for the model with inverse distance matrix. Although we find positive 
dependence between new business density and income inequality, the negative feedback 
suggests entrepreneurial activities (proxied by new business density) will reduce income 
inequality over time.  For middle-and low-income countries, the results show both negative direct 
and indirect effects of entrepreneurship (proxied by new business density) on income inequality. 
The feedback effect using the model with contiguity matrix is negative 0.1041 and that of the 
model with the inverse matrix is negative 0.0014.
Table 1. 7: Results of Spatial Durbin model: innovation, entry rate and income inequality 
 Queen contiguity matrix Inverse distance matrix 
 Model without interaction Model with interaction Model without interaction Model with interaction 
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Observation 1513 425 1088 1513 425 1088 1513 425 1088 1513 425 1088 
R-squared  0.4959 0.6231 0.4089 0.5381 0.6359 0.4169 0.5248 0.6748 0.4812 0.5707 0.6841 0.4855 
Log Likelihood 545.8039 458.8539 555.1783 606.6135 465.3581 565.4263 583.3087 490.4960 616.6915 655.2474 496.5231 625.6000 
AIC (Spatial model) -1061.6078 -887.7077 -1080.3567 -1175.2271 -892.7162 -1092.8526 -1136.6175 -950.9919 -1203.3831 -1272.4948 -955.0462 -1213.2000 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
Table 1. 8: Results of innovation, entry rate and income inequality 
Spatial weight matrix based on queen contiguity matrix 
 Overall Sample High income Middle and low income  
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
ln[K/L] -0.2031*** -0.3758*** -0.5789*** 0.3375*** 0.3133*** 0.6508*** -1.2107*** 0.1429 -1.0678***  
[0.0372] [0.0418] [0.0604] [0.0712] [0.1044] [0.0428] [0.1309] [0.2513] [0.2784] 
lnPCT -0.0271*** 0.0127*** -0.0145*** 0.0357** -0.0523*** -0.0165 -0.0141*** 0.0191** 0.0050  
[0.0014] [0.0025] [0.0018] [0.0176] [0.0096] [0.0220] [0.0034] [0.0097] [0.0129] 
lnENTRY -0.0103** 0.0131 0.0027 0.1015*** -0.0971*** 0.0044 -0.0526*** -0.0122 -0.0649***  
[0.0036] [0.0138] [0.0174] [0.0208] [0.0263] [0.0402] [0.0067] [0.0109] [0.0154] 
lnRGDPC 0.0109* 0.0171 0.0280 -0.1622*** 0.0330 -0.1293*** 0.0790*** -0.0227 0.0564***  
[0.0057] [0.0158] [0.0184] [0.0267] [0.0324] [0.0072] [0.0100] [0.0171] [0.0202] 
lnOPN -0.1417*** 0.0894*** -0.0523*** -0.1419*** -0.0073 -0.1491*** -0.1116*** 0.0526*** -0.0590*  
[0.0058] [0.0130] [0.0146] [0.0184] [0.0163] [0.0177] [0.0144] [0.0218] [0.0265] 
INST 0.0430*** -0.0442*** -0.0011 0.0953** -0.1588*** -0.0634 0.0472*** -0.0401* 0.0071  
[0.0036] [0.0077] [0.0103] [0.0479] [0.0251] [0.0589] [0.0106] [0.0298] [0.0373] 
lnPCT*INST -0.0045*** 0.0037*** -0.0008 -0.0066 0.0090*** 0.0024 0.0048*** 0.0109* 0.0157**  
[0.0006] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0048] [0.0022] [0.0054] [0.0017] [0.0058] [0.0072] 
lnENTRY*INST -0.0154*** 0.0058 -0.0096*** -0.0124* 0.0266*** 0.0143 -0.0129*** -0.0219 -0.0349  
[0.0030] [0.0051] [0.0033] [0.0072] [0.0064] [0.0108] [0.0040] [0.0160] [0.0160] 
          
Spatial weight matrix based on inverse distance matrix 
 Overall Sample High income Middle and low income  
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
ln[K/L] -0.1957*** -0.6552*** -0.8509*** 0.3475*** 0.4368 0.7843* -1.1302*** 0.5522 -0.5780  
[0.0377] [0.1542] [0.1533] [0.0976] [0.2884] [0.3761] [0.1926] [0.3494] [0.4685] 
lnPCT -0.0276*** 0.0175*** -0.0101 0.0415** -0.0627** -0.0211 -0.0143*** 0.0286** 0.0143  
[0.0027] [0.0035] [0.0058] [0.0184] [0.0260] [0.0392] [0.0021] [0.0101] [0.0085] 
lnENTRY -0.0119 0.0228 0.0109 0.1001** -0.0782*** 0.0219 -0.0507*** -0.0105 -0.0612***  
[0.0061] [0.0285] [0.0329] [0.0438] [0.0294] [0.0600] [0.0113] [0.0151] [0.0188] 
lnRGDPC 0.0124*** 0.0217 0.0341** -0.1686*** 0.0539 -0.1148 0.0748*** -0.0423 0.0325  
[0.0033] [0.0182] [0.0190] [0.0325] [0.0922] [0.1138] [0.0112] [0.0261] [0.0341] 
lnOPN -0.1460*** 0.1448*** -0.0012 -0.1447*** -0.0266 -0.1713*** -0.1138*** 0.0597*** -0.0541**  
[0.0148] [0.0372] [0.0456] [0.0115] [0.0290] [0.0271] [0.0083] [0.0136] [0.0194] 
INST 0.0442*** -0.0706*** -0.0263** 0.1182* -0.1720** -0.0538 0.0479*** -0.0929*** -0.0450  
[0.0047] [0.0168] [0.0127] [0.0723] [0.1065] [0.1412] [0.0050] [0.0233] [0.0210] 
lnPCT*INST -0.0044*** 0.0060*** 0.0015* -0.0084 0.0100 0.0016 0.0046** 0.0196*** 0.0242***  
[0.0006] [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0056] [0.0093] [0.0131] [0.0017] [0.0047] [0.0045] 
lnENTRY*INST -0.0162*** 0.0111 -0.0051 -0.0131 0.0248*** 0.0117 -0.0122 -0.0170** -0.0291***  
[0.0016] [0.0074] [0.0080] [0.0121] [0.0061] [0.0148] [0.0088] [0.0080] [0.0112] 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
 
We further replaced our spatial weight matrix with the inverse distance matrix (with k-nearest 
neighbor of 5). The results of the point estimates of the SDM are presented in Table 1. 9 and the 
marginal coefficients in Table 1. 10. Qualitatively, we find that results in Table 1. 10 are compares 
favorably to the results in Table 1. 4. For middle- and low-income countries, we find that the 
feedback effect for innovation using the first part of Table 1. 10 is negative 0.0356, suggesting a 
possible 3.56% decline in income inequality if middle and low-income countries engage in more 
innovation. In terms of self-employment, the feedback effect, for middle- and low-income 
countries, is positive 0.0048. This shows about 0.48% increase in income inequality whenever 
there is an increase in self-employment. 
Table 1. 9: Results of innovation, self-employment, and income inequality: based on inverse distance 
matrix. 
 Model without interaction Model with interaction 
























































































































































































































Observation 1513 425 1088 1513 425 1088 
R-squared 0.5653 0.6476 0.5213 0.5941 0.6790 0.5422 
Log Likelihood 655.2606 474.7021 666.6939 704.1999 494.3107 698.4089 
AIC [Spatial model] -1280.5211 -919.4043 -1303.3877 -1370.3999 -950.6214 -1358.8177 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
 
 
Table 1. 10: Marginal impact based on inverse distance matrix. 
Model without interactions 
Model Overall Sample  High income  Middle and low income 















































































































***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
 
Model with interactions 
Model Overall Sample  High income  Middle and low income 

















































































































































***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
 
1.5 Concluding remarks. 
This study aims to analyze the effect of innovation and entrepreneurial activity on income 
inequality in middle- and low-income countries. The current study examined the feedback and 
spillover effects using spatial econometric techniques on longitudinal data spanning the period 
2000 to 2016. The econometric methodology adopted in this study takes into account the 
important country heterogeneity. The empirical results indicate that innovation is significant in 
widening income inequality, especially for high income countries. A positive innovation-
inequality dependence is only statistically significant if we measure entrepreneurial activity by 
new business density. The findings also demonstrate that the effect of entrepreneurial activity on 
income inequality in middle and low income differs depending on the proxy used. While we find 
evidence of positive nexus between self-employment and income inequality, the relationship 
between new business density and income inequality is negative. This may be due to how each 
of them is measured. Thus, the high number of informal self-employed (necessity entrepreneurs) 
in the measure of self-employment may have necessitated this nexus. While self-employment 
produced positive feedback effect, the new business density shows a negative feedback effect 
which suggest that entrepreneurial activity in the middle and low income is linked to rising 
income inequality when self-employment is used but negative when proxied by new business 
density. In terms of high-income countries, we find no dependence between our self-employment 
and income inequality but positive with new business density. Our findings suggest that 
entrepreneurial activities (proxied by new business density) are linked to rising income 
inequality in high income countries. This study also examined whether institutional quality act 
as mediator in influencing the innovation–income inequality or entrepreneurship-income 
inequality nexus. The findings demonstrate that institutional quality act as mediator to increase 
income inequality in high income countries when interacted with innovation but contrary in the 
middle and low income in the model with self-employment. But the model with new business 
density shows otherwise. The interaction between institutional quality and entrepreneurial 
activity is only found to strongly reduce income inequality in middle- and low-income countries 
but not in high income countries. Although, it is puzzling to observe a positive relationship 
between institutional quality and inequality. We explore further the relationship in the next 
chapter. 
For policy implications, to reduce income inequality, the national “cake” needs to be 
shared, and all talents need opportunities for innovation. Innovation should be encouraged 
because all technological advancements have the potential to promote productivity and economic 
growth in the long run. This said, to reduce the negative effects associated with innovations, 
technology sharing policies can be adopted to reduce monopoly power attributed to intellectual 
property rights enforceability. In addition better institutional quality are needed to address 
income inequality, particularly institutions that opt for zero tolerance for corruption, so that both 
small and medium enterprises can have equal access to resources and technological advances. 
This will encourage individuals to create enterprises and provide attractive job opportunities. 
One possible solution to increase entrepreneurial activities while reducing inequality is for 
governments in developing countries to offer various schemes targeting the poor, especially 
finance. Our findings use only patent applications, it is vital to explore other innovations such as 
technological upgrading in exports, a mixture of trademark and industrial design which are 
highly sought after in the middle and low countries, and innovation in services before arriving at 
a generalization. Also, exploring how potential sources of research and development funding and 
their performing sectors influence income distribution is very relevant to advancing the 
literature.  Also, we foresee a possible link between entrepreneurship and poverty which 
might explain the entrepreneurship-inequality nexus. Using large datasets covering 
entrepreneurial propensity at the micro-level may further inform policy decisions in middle- and 
low-income countries. 
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Appendix 1. 1: Summary of the explanatory variables 
 Variable Description Source  
Gini Gini index of disposable income  SWIID 8.3 
Innovation [PCT] Patent applications   WIPO 
Entrepreneurial activity 
(ENT) 
Entrepreneurial activity is measured by self-employment and entry rate 
of new business.  
1. Self-employment is measured as the number of self-employed 
people [% of total employment]. This is further disaggregated into 
employers and own account workers. 
2. Entry rate is measured as number of newly registered corporations 
per 1,000 working-age people [those ages 15–64]. 
WDI 
/Doingbusiness.org 
GDP per capita 
(RGDPC) 
GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity [PPP]. Data are in 
constant 2017 international dollars. 
WDI 
Trade Openness (OPN) Sum of exports and imports as a percent of GDP  WDI 
Institutional quality 
(INST) 
Is the score from principal component analysis of the six governance 
variables – control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, voice and accountability and political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism [Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011].  
WBGI 
Capital per worker 
(K/L) 
Is the ratio of capital stock to labor force PWT 9.1/ WDI 
 
  
Appendix 1. 2: List of sampled countries  
High income country Middle and low-income countries  
Austria Benin Albania Mozambique 
Belgium Bolivia Algeria Namibia 
Canada Brazil Argentina Russian Federation 
Czech Republic Bulgaria Armenia Senegal 
Denmark Burkina Faso Bangladesh Sierra Leone 
Estonia Belarus Cameroon Tanzania 
Finland China Ecuador Thailand 
France Colombia Egypt, Arab Rep. Togo 
Germany Ethiopia El Salvador Tunisia 
Italy Georgia Ghana Turkey 
Latvia Poland Guatemala Uganda 
Lithuania India Guinea Ukraine 
Luxembourg Indonesia Honduras Pakistan 
Netherlands Iran, Islamic Rep. Iraq Paraguay 
Norway Ivory Coast Malaysia Peru 
Portugal Jordan Mali South Africa 
Romania Kazakhstan Mauritania Sudan 
Slovak Republic Kenya Mexico Swaziland 
Slovenia Kyrgyz Republic Moldova Venezuela, RB 
Spain Niger Mongolia Vietnam 
Sweden Nigeria Morocco Zambia 
Switzerland North Macedonia Zimbabwe  
United States    
Hungary    




Institutional quality and income inequality in developing countries: a dynamic panel threshold 
analysis.  
CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: A DYNAMIC PANEL THRESHOLD ANALYSIS. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
One critical issue facing economists and policymakers worldwide is the persistent problem of 
poverty and income inequality. Recent evidence demonstrates that many countries with high 
economic growth rates have also witnessed an increase in income inequality (Dulani, Mattes, and 
Logan, 2013; Piketty, 2015; Jain-Chandra et al., 2016). Lived poverty continues to worsen as the 
reported high economic growth rates do not trickle down to the grassroots, thereby exacerbating 
the distortion in the income distribution. This has cast doubt on the efficacy of various economic 
policy prescriptions designed to minimize the impact of poverty and income inequality. Data 
show global inequality has declined over the last three decades, but within-country inequality 
remains relatively high in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (Easterly, 2007; 
Bourguignon, 2018; Alvaredo et al., 2018; Ravallion, 2019). For example, a report by the African 
Development Bank in 2012 showed that 6 out of the 10 countries with the greatest inequality 
worldwide are found in Sub-Saharan Africa; with Gini indices above 0.50, countries such as 
Botswana, South Africa, and Namibia top the list of countries with unequal income distributions 
(Odusola, Cornia, Bhorat, & Conceição, 2019). Anecdotal evidence shows that institutional 
processes have paved the way for corruption, political clientelism, political instability, and other 
irregularities that undermine property rights and, hence, contribute to rising income inequality 
in these countries. Prominent institutional economists such as Trebing (1987) and North (1990), 
among others, have demonstrated that the proper functioning of a market economy is dependent 
on appropriate institutions that embody societal norms (Dolfsma, 2013). 
An institution is defined as a set of working rules that can be thought of as stable 
agreements that channel, constrain, and regulate the behaviors of firms, workers, and other 
stakeholders in society, and hence contribute to economic performance in a nation-state (Ostrom, 
1990; North, 1990; Fabro and Aixalá, 2009; Campbell, 2010). These incentive structures include 
formal and informal rules, laws, and policies that define a range of market actors’ legitimate 
actions. An institutional framework’s performance may depend on the aggregate preferences that 
underlie institutional reforms (Ravallion, 2014; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). It is widely 
accepted that a poor institutional regime has a deleterious effect on income distributions 
(Wisman, 2013; Albertus and Menaldo, 2014). Prior studies, including Daniel, Fu, and Dolfsma 
(2018) and Lee and Kim (2009), hold the view that the private sectors in developing economies 
would benefit if western forms of formal institutions were implemented in those countries, and 
hence, the concentration of wealth among a few elites would be reduced. Without such 
institutions, Daniel et al. (2018) demonstrate that an “institutional void” may arise and hamper 
policy efforts to reduce income inequality through efficient market operations. In contrast, others 
suggest that even the absence of such formal institutions may affect market functioning. Studies 
have found a positive relationship between low institutional quality and high income inequality, 
including Perera and Lee (2013), Chong and Gradstein (2007), Gyimah-Brempong and Camacho 
(2006), Gyimah-Brempong (2002), and Alesina and Perotti (1996). In particular, Alesina and 
Perotti (1996) found that income inequality is relatively high in countries with social unrest and 
political instability. Chong and Gradstein (2007) also found that weaker institutional quality 
worsens income distribution, while Gyimah-Brempong (2002) demonstrated that corruption is 
the source of high income inequality in Africa. Perera and Lee (2013) also reported evidence of a 
positive relationship between the Gini index and institutional measures, corruption, democratic 
accountability, and bureaucratic quality in nine Asian economies. Studies that also found 
negative effects include Scully (1988), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2008), and Gwama (2014), who validated that countries with well-developed institutional 
mechanisms have the potential to foster reductions in income inequality, as well as long-term 
growth through avenues for shared capital accumulation. Others, including Chong and Calderón 
(2000) and Li, Xu, and Zou (2000), emphasized the nonlinearity of the relationship between 
institutions and income inequality, mimicking the famous Kuznets inverted U-shaped curve. For 
example, Li, Xu, and Zou (2000) found an inverted U-shaped effect of corruption on income 
inequality, with corruption alone explaining a large proportion of the Gini differential across 
developing and industrial countries. This evidence was supported by Andres and Ramlogan-
Dobson (2011) after examining the effects of corruption on income inequality in Latin America. 
Although there are numerous explanations that stress the salience of institutions for economic 
growth and development, arguably, there are no coherent institutional explanations for the 
institutions–income inequality nexus found in the literature. It is impossible to draw a conclusion 
on the extent to which institutions impact income inequality in developing economies. In the 
theoretical literature, maintenance of property rights is considered one of the most important 
pillars of a capitalist economy. Well-defined property rights are an important step in reducing 
inequality through efficient resource allocation and investment (North, 1990). There is a strong 
perception that institutions play a mediating role in understanding the causes and challenges of 
poverty and income inequality, but little has been done to investigate the existence of an 
institutional threshold. In addition, the econometric approaches used are not robust for finding 
the threshold effects of institutions on income inequality (Ibrahim, 2020). This study, therefore, 
examines the impact of institutions on income inequality in developing countries, given the 
institutional level. Developing countries are of particular importance for two reasons. First, they 
are saddled with high lived poverty and income inequality (Perera and Lee, 2013; Chong and 
Gradstein, 2007). Second, due to sluggish growth rates and high poverty, weak institutions are 
inherent in most developing countries. There is a consensus that weak institutions are the primary 
cause of high levels of income inequality due to corruption, political clientelism, lax legal regimes, 
or political interferences, as they tend to divert productive resources for private gains.  
In this study we extend the literature in four respects. First, from previous chapter, we 
found positive relationship between income inequality and institutional quality of developing 
countries. We extend this study further by examining the relationship using a dynamic approach 
as static analysis may not capture the time influence. Also, most of the results of prior studies in 
the literature are based on dynamics analysis. Second, we examine the institution–inequality 
nexus in which the level of institutions acts as a regime-switching trigger, bifurcating the 
relationship between institutions and income inequality. Through this, our study highlights the 
impact of institutions on income inequality when institutions are below and above an estimated 
threshold level. While institutional quality is fragile and varies in the developing world, the 
appropriate level of institutional target is unclear. Hence, we compare the level in developing 
countries with that in the developed world. Third, by using institutions as a regime-switching 
trigger, we employ two broad institutional data sets gleaned from the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This allows us to show the 
relative effect of institutions on income inequality in developing countries using different proxies 
for institutions. In discussing institutions, we consider three indicators of institutional quality: 
control of corruption, government effectiveness, and the rule of law (Bekaert, Harvey, and 
Lundblad, 2005). The emphasis on these measures is based on their contribution to preserving 
property rights. An environment with poor respect for the rule of law, government 
ineffectiveness, and high corruption enhances opportunistic behavior that allows segments of 
economic actors to accumulate wealth. Four, we use Kremer, Bick, and Nautz's (2013) dynamic 
threshold regression, a dynamic version of Hansen’s panel threshold model, to shed more light 
on the institution–income inequality nexus. By applying the forward orthogonal deviations 
transformation suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995), the model combines the instrumental 
variables estimation of the cross-sectional threshold model introduced by Caner and Hansen 
(2004) with Hansen’s (1999) panel threshold model. In the dynamic model, the endogeneity of 
important control variables is no longer an issue. This permits us to estimate the critical level of 
institutions for income inequality for both advanced and developing countries despite the 
endogeneity problem of income inequality.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The following subsection provides stylized 
facts about institutional quality and income inequality in developing countries. Section 2 offers a 
brief literature review on the subject. Section 3 describes the methodology, while section 4 
discusses the results. The final section presents concluding remarks and policy implications. 
 2.2 Institutions and income inequality in developing countries: An overview 
In this subsection, we discuss the trend of income inequality and institutions in developing 
countries. The aim is to situate the institutions and income distributions of developing economies 
in the context of the global trend. We proceed with an overview of income inequality, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. 13.  
 
Figure 2. 1: Gini coefficient of Disposable income around the world 
 
The bulk of recent global economic data showing fewer people at risk of extreme poverty, but 
economic gaps continue to grow as the very rich continue to accumulate unprecedented levels of 
wealth, deepening within-country inequality. Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. 
reports much higher average income inequality for emerging and developing countries compared 
to that of advanced and European Union countries. Generally, income inequality is high in 
developing countries, with Sub-Saharan Africa having the most unequal countries, preceded only 
by those in Latin America. South Africa4, for example, tops the income inequality chart with a 
                                                          
3 Computed using the population-weighted average of country-specific Gini coefficients from the global income inequality database 
(Darvas, 2019). This measure of income inequality is based on GDP per capita and GNI per capita. 
4 It must be noted that income inequality in SSA is measured using the consumption-based approach, 
except for South Africa whose income inequality is based on income approach. Hence, this could explain 
why we observe higher inequality in South Africa than in other SSA countries.   
Gini index above 0.70, followed by Botswana and Namibia. Inequality in the Middle East and 
North Africa is stable, remaining below 0.40. We see an upward drift in the average income 
inequality of emerging and developing Asia, which is most likely due to the economic 
development in China and India, where within-country income inequality has increased very 
sharply since the economic boom in the 1990s. According to Milanovic and Roemer (2016), the 
rise in income inequality in emerging and developing Asia was mostly driven by the very high 
income growth rates in China and India and the economic transformation in relatively poor 
populous countries, such as Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. According to Lustig, Lopez-
Calva, & Ortiz-Juarez, (2013), the decline in the Gini indexes of countries in Latin America is a 
result of the decrease in the earnings gap between skilled and low-skilled workers and an increase 
in government transfers to the poor. Nonetheless, Darvas (2019) emphasized that institutional 
development toward redistribution in advanced countries, particularly in Europe, influenced the 
dynamics of income inequality, and the situation in emerging and developing economies appears 
to yield the least impact. In this regard, we question if this could be traceable to the quality of 
institutional mechanisms in these regions. To understand how institutions influence income 
distribution, Bates (2006) argued that it is important to examine the role of both economic and 
non-economic institutions to understand how the institutional configuration of power 
relationships affects the control of resource flow in developing economies. We examine the 
institutional dynamics in these regions (see Figure 2. 2). In Figure 2. 2, North America, Europe, 
and Central Asia performed better in all three institutional indicators, with scores ranging above 
60 percent. East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and 
North Africa also scored between 40 and 60 percent. The lowest performers were Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia, scoring below 40 percent in all indicators. Compared to South Asia, Sub-
Saharan Africa countries lag in terms of corruption control, government effectiveness, and the 
rule of law. Comparatively, while East Asia and the Pacific performed better than Latin America 
and the Caribbean on the rule of law, we see the opposite in government effectiveness and 
corruption control. The issue of low institutional quality in Sub-Saharan Africa remains a 
fundamental problem, masking her developmental progress. This includes the quality of policies 
and legal frameworks that are expected to encourage redistribution of income and the desired 
resource allocation. The linkage between high inequality and the extent of institutional 
development in most developing economies can be clearly seen when making country-specific 
references (see Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata.). 
 
Figure 2. 2: Indicators of institutional quality 
 
In column 2, we find countries such as Namibia, South Africa, Costa Rica, Malaysia, Poland, 
Botswana, Hungary, Uruguay, and Chile, in descending order, scored above 60 percent. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, for instance, South Africa represents one of the economies with very high 
institutional development, but it surprisingly also tops the list of the most unequal countries in 
the world. The country’s shortfall in the political environment (in terms of the rule of law) appears 
to aggravate the level of inequality. Côte d'Ivoire also recorded an average score of 19.11%, largely 
due to political instabilities that undermined the country’s progress in the early 1990s. Like the 
situation in South Africa, the country has a lower rating on the rule of law, scoring 15.15% on 
average. This situation is also unique to Latin America and the Caribbean. Chile, a model 
economy with a good institutional regime, suffers from relatively high inequality. We also find 
countries with low institutions, including Venezuela and Paraguay, score below 20 percent on 
average in all indicators.  
2.3 Literature Review  
The subject of how institutions impact income distribution has been a notable debate in the 
economic literature for more than four decades, as most scholars suspect economic reform 
failures may have compromised the outcomes of political circumstances by protecting the 
interests of economic and social elites rather than those of the poor and disenfranchised (Batuo & 
Asongu, 2015). Recent interest in institutions by the international community and researchers 
coincides with a paradigm shift in global affairs to corruption control and transparency in the 
fight against poverty and unequal opportunities in developing countries. This fight started with 
the introduction of a second generation of reforms that targeted structural and institutional 
constraints, such as improvements in legal, regulatory, supervisory, and other institutional 
environments. Despite limited knowledge and inconclusive evidence on the interrelationship 
between institutions and inequality, it is widely acknowledged that poor institutions have a 
deleterious effect on egalitarian income distribution. Studies that found such relationships have 
largely focused on the corruption–inequality nexus due to compounding cases of corruption over 
the last three decades (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Gyimah-Brempong and Camacho, 2006; Andres 
and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2011). Contemporary studies, however, point out that weak institutional 
factors such as government ineffectiveness and absence of the rule of law could contribute to 
deterioration in the income distributions of developing countries (Chong and Gradstein, 2007; 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Knack and Keefer, 1995). These studies demonstrate 
that institutional quality, notwithstanding the rule of law and government effectiveness, is 
imperative for economic growth, which is also necessary for poverty alleviation and the 
distribution of economic benefits across the social and economic ladder’s various levels (Dollar 
& Kraay, 2003). In this regard, poor institutions not only deter economic growth but may also 
impact poverty incidence and contribute to the path dependence of institution-driven poverty 
traps. Empirically, several studies have examined the link between institutions and income 
inequality, but the debate remains inconclusive because there is no specific threshold to inform 
policy decisions.  
Using a dynamic panel and linear feedback analysis on data from 121 countries, Chong 
and Gradstein (2007) found that weaker institutions contribute to higher income inequality. 
Likewise, Gyimah-Brempong (2002) employed a dynamic panel estimator using data from 
selected African countries to investigate the effects of corruption on income distribution. The 
author demonstrated that higher corruption adversely impacted income distribution efforts. 
Further evidence from Gyimah-Brempong and Camacho (2006), who use a panel of 61 countries, 
shows that corruption has a much larger effect on income distributions in Africa and Latin 
America compared to countries in Asia. In a study of institutions and income distribution, Chong 
and Calderón (2000) found a quadratic relationship between institutions and income inequality. 
Their findings further showed that for poor countries, institutions are positively linked to income 
inequality, while institutions in advanced economies are negatively associated with income 
inequality. Using simple ordinary least squares and instrumental variable regression, Li et al. 
(2000) established the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between corruption and 
income inequality. Given their findings, the authors argued that inequality declines with 
moderations in the level of corruption, but only when the level of corruption exceeds a threshold 
of 2.91 in the OLS model and 4.7 for the 2SLS specification. These findings are in line with 
evidence from Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), who also 
argued the probable existence of an augmented Kuznets curve between institutional quality and 
income inequality. Andres and Ramlogan-Dobson (2011) suggested that there may exist a trade-
off between corruption and income inequality such that at a lower level of corruption, income 
inequality may be at its highest in Latin America. Similarly, Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009) 
find corruption less harmful in countries where individual rent-seeking behavior is well-
coordinated and more internalized. Perera and Lee (2013) investigated the implications of 
economic growth and institutions on poverty and income inequality using data from nine 
developing countries in Asia from 1985 to 2009. Using a generalized method of moments (SGMM) 
estimation, they showed that while growth does not appear to affect income inequality, 
improvements in corruption control, democratic accountability, and bureaucratic quality are 
associated with high income inequality. This finding supports prior studies that found the 
Kuznets inverted U-shape between institutions and income inequality. Notwithstanding this, 
employing both cross-country and panel data specifications, Davis and Hopkins (2011) found no 
support for the commonly held belief that democratic political institutions are an important 
determinant of income inequality, but reported strong evidence of a negative relationship 
between property rights and income inequality. 
 2.4 Research Method 
2.4.1 Data sources and description 
We perform a dynamic threshold regression using a balanced sample of 52 developing and 24 
developed countries for the period 1996–2017. The choice of countries and time period is based 
on data availability. Our original sample included all countries, but countries with insufficient 
data were excluded to enhance the smoothness of the data and allow for fluctuations in the data 
set. We use the Gini index of disposable income from the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID), as our preferred measure of income inequality. The Gini index of disposable 
income is based on the inequality in disposable (post-tax, post-transfer) income. Thus, for 
countries where inequality is derived from consumption-based approaches, it is assumed that 
household consumption equals household disposable income. On institutions, we use two data 
sources, first the World Bank governance indicators and second, the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) datasets. The ICRG datasets include bureaucratic quality, corruption control and 
rule of law (Bekaert et al., 2005). These indicators are comparable to the World Bank governance 
indicators government effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption, and have been used 
in prior studies (Chong and Calderón, 2000; Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2006; Chong and 
Gradstein, 2007; Law, Tan, and Azman-Saini, 2014). In the theoretical literature, maintenance of 
property rights is considered one of the most important pillars of a capitalist economy. Well-
defined property rights are important determinant of economic growth and income distribution 
through efficient resource allocation and investment (North, 1990). Efficient resource allocations 
is impeded by corruption; weak law enforcement; the lack of clear rules, transparency, and 
accountability in public officials; and concentration of unlimited discretionary governmental 
power (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2006; Gyimah-Brempong and Camacho, 2006; Farrington, 
2009). We choose these measures based on their links to efficient resource allocation and how 
they influence opportunity creation. The relevance of the first measure is aligned with the 
assertion that government effectiveness is necessary for implementing and protecting rules and 
regulations (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002). Likewise, we include control of corruption 
based on anecdotal findings that suggest corruption is still a major problem undermining the 
realization of actual societal outcomes in most developing and emerging economies. This reflects 
the likelihood that officials will demand illegal payments or use their positions for political 
clientelism (Markussen, 2011). The rule of law, on the other hand, emphasizes citizens’ 
willingness to accept established institutions for socioeconomic justice and fair resource 
allocation (Berg & Desai, 2013). The absence of the rule of law may increase opportunistic 
behavior by some economic agents to accumulate more wealth, widening the inequality gap. 
Consistent with prior studies such as Adams and Klobodu (2016) and Jauch and Watzka (2016), 
we control for the effects of real GDP per capita, fiscal deficits, trade openness, and human capital.   
Appendix 2. 1 provides a brief description of the variables. We illustrate the reinforcing effect of 
institutions on income inequality in a cross-country setup in Figure 2. 3. 
 
Figure 2. 3: Institutions and income inequality 
2.4.2 Measurement of governance indicators 
Various institutional indicators exist. However, for this study we dwell on the WGI and ICRG 
institutional indicators. The WGI institutional indicators are compiled from expert opinions and 
survey sources that report the views and experiences of citizens, entrepreneurs, and experts in 
the public, private and NGO sectors from around the world, on the quality of various aspects of 
governance. These sources include surveys of households and firms (such as Afrobarometer 
surveys, Gallup World Poll, and Global Competitiveness Report survey), Commercial business 
information providers (such as Economist Intelligence Unit, IHS Markit, Political Risk Services), 
Non-governmental organizations (including Global Integrity, Freedom House, Reporters 
Without Borders) and Public sector organizations (including the CPIA assessments of World 
Bank and regional development banks, the EBRD Transition Report, French Ministry of Finance 
Institutional Profiles Database). The government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality 
of public services. Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and control of corruption, that captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. The indicators from the various data 
sources are then rescaled from 0 – 1, after which it is weighted using the Unobserved Components 
Model (UCM) to range between -2.5 and +2.5. Due to its data sources, many researchers have 
argued that the WGI institutional indices are “subjective” and based on expert assessment and 
opinions that may be biased (see Knack and Keefer 1995). Another concern among prior studies, 
is its comparability overtime and across countries (Bardhan 2008). The ICRG institutional 
indicators on the other hand are based on country risk assessments and more objective than the 
WGI indices. For instance, control of corruption index is measured on a six-points scale. It 
measured from actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job 
reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics 
and business. Bureaucracy quality is measured on a four-points scale. It measures the institutional 
strength and quality of the bureaucracy. High points are given to countries where the 
bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong 
bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms 
of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions. Law and Order is also measured 
on a six-point scale. This measure is based on two indicators, (i) law which assesses the strength 
and impartiality of the legal system. (ii) Order is based on assessment of popular observance of 
the law.  
In this Figure 2. 3, both income inequality and institutions are captured as averages from 
1996 to 2017. Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata.  and Errore. L'origine riferimento 
non è stata trovata. reports the descriptive statistics and list of countries used in the study. 
Table 2. 1: Mean of institutional quality of all sampled countries 










Argentina 43.11 43.40 53.20 34.12 42.89 
Armenia 49.24 40.13 48.38 41.23 30.79 
Bangladesh 38.88 20.57 25.37 22.40 13.93 
Bolivia 47.34 30.85 37.87 23.64 31.04 
Botswana 63.07 73.36 70.11 70.15 79.83 
Brazil 57.86 51.44 51.91 47.87 54.54 
Bulgaria 44.52 54.14 59.11 51.01 52.30 
Chile 51.67 87.11 84.59 87.38 89.35 
China 41.08 45.52 57.81 37.59 41.15 
Colombia 51.9 44.89 50.46 37.85 46.36 
Costa Rica 48.69 68.60 64.63 67.58 73.59 
Côte d'Ivoire 50.34 19.11 18.33 15.15 23.85 
Dominican Republic 44.65 31.80 36.38 32.26 26.76 
Ecuador 47.62 24.94 27.92 20.31 26.57 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 46.75 37.94 36.73 45.13 31.97 
El Salvador 43.92 38.74 44.97 30.84 40.41 
Gambia, The 48.06 33.76 29.91 39.10 32.27 
Ghana 45.01 52.92 52.16 54.14 52.46 
Honduras 49.64 22.90 29.19 18.57 20.94 
Hungary 50.26 73.41 75.15 75.17 69.92 
Indonesia 41.27 33.80 43.70 31.56 26.15 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 44.09 30.49 37.09 22.11 32.26 
Jamaica 42.76 51.66 61.24 43.50 50.25 
Kazakhstan 36.19 25.93 36.34 25.02 16.42 
Kenya 49.87 25.24 35.39 24.36 15.98 
Malawi 49.86 37.66 33.22 45.81 33.94 
Malaysia 45.72 69.34 80.29 64.86 62.88 
Mexico 47.40 46.27 61.18 36.86 40.75 
Moldova 50.64 33.20 31.70 41.19 26.73 
Mongolia 36.54 42.58 40.09 48.35 39.30 
Namibia 69.51 62.30 60.27 59.84 66.81 
Pakistan 35.76 24.16 31.39 23.17 17.93 
Panama 53.09 52.52 60.03 51.29 46.24 
Paraguay 48.80 17.81 17.97 21.79 13.67 
Peru 52.61 41.08 45.22 32.46 45.55 
Philippines 46.20 43.12 54.64 40.81 33.91 
Poland 48.44 70.89 71.45 70.03 71.18 
Romania 41.68 49.73 46.43 53.94 48.83 
Russian  47.02 26.80 40.91 22.27 17.23 
South Africa 67.93 64.25 69.81 58.21 64.73 
Sri Lanka 44.83 51.18 49.56 55.58 48.38 
Tanzania 40.44 36.34 34.98 41.14 32.90 
Thailand 45.83 54.97 64.04 55.24 45.64 
Tunisia 42.39 55.63 61.76 52.06 53.06 
Turkey 44.3 56.20 60.30 54.24 54.05 
Uganda 46.68 31.68 36.15 39.54 19.35 
Ukraine 23.57 23.37 29.70 24.19 16.21 
Uruguay 50.15 75.02 69.79 69.67 85.59 
Venezuela 42.65 11.29 14.58 7.44 11.85 
Vietnam 40.14 39.63 45.76 39.46 33.66 
Zambia 58.28 34.21 24.94 40.44 37.25 
Source: Computation from Worldwide Governance Indicators (2019) 
 
 
Table 2. 2: Descriptive statistics all sampled countries, 1996–2017. 
 Developing countries Advanced countries 
Variable Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Gini Index 42.80 26.30 66.40 29.54 21.80 38.20 
Per capita income 9804.88 743.00 27049.30 37380.14 8613.20 98537.40 
Trade openness 72.27 15.64 220.41 94.83 22.15 408.36 
Human capital 2.42 1.28 3.40 3.23 2.11 3.81 
Fiscal policy -2.54 -16.61 16.91 -1.64 -32.03 18.68 
Institution ICRG 0.00 -2.44 3.34 -0.00 -2.79 0.73 
Institution WBGI 0.00 -2.37 2.89 0.00 -2.56 1.87 
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Zambia 
 
2.4.3 Model specification 
In this study, we use an extended endogenous growth model with specifications based on North 
(1990). Endogenous growth theory provided insight into the significance of institutional effects 
on economic growth after it became obvious that growth models (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990) 
were theoretically inadequate to explain economic prosperity. These theories ignored the fact that 
economies could converge to a steady state of shared economic prosperity if they had a working 
institutional framework to support productive activities. However, endogenous growth theory 
recognizes that quality institutions are part of an economic system and, hence, an important factor 
in resource allocation and distribution. Our empirical model is based on Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) 
augmented endogenous growth model, which formalizes the relationship between institutional 
quality and income inequality. Our baseline econometric model is specified as follows:  
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑰𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕, 𝜺~𝑵(𝟎, 𝝈
𝟐) (2.1) 
where 𝒚𝒊𝒕 represents income inequality, measured by the Gini index of disposable income; 𝑰𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 
is institutional quality; 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is vector of controls; 𝜷 represents the parameters to be estimated; and 
𝜺𝒊𝒕 is a white noise error term. In examining the threshold effect, a frequently used basic approach 
is to include a quadratic institutional term in the baseline equation (Chong and Calderón, 2000; 
Li, Xu, and Zou, 2000). This approach comes with limitations, as emphasized in Ibrahim (2020); 
for example, a quadratic term of the threshold variable does not illustrate how the relationship 
between institutions and income inequality can be mediated by institutions. In addition, this 
approach does not provide the precise impact of institutions when they are below or above the 
threshold. Standard threshold regressions such as Hansen's (1999) non-dynamic panel threshold 
regression and Caner and Hansen's (2004) cross-sectional threshold regression are used to 
address these limitations, but both econometric techniques suffer from endogeneity bias. To 
overcome this, we adopt Kremer, Bick, and Nautz’s (2013) dynamic panel threshold regression. 
This econometric technique is an improvement over the Hansen (1999) and Caner and Hansen 
(2004) threshold regressions. It is robust to the potential endogeneity bias of the previous models 
and unlike Gonzalez, Teräsvirta, Van Dijk, and Yang's (2017) panel smooth transition model, 
which is only applicable to balanced panels, allows for unbalanced panels. The baseline threshold 
model is specified as follows: 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝝁𝒊 + 𝑰(𝑰𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 ≤ 𝜸) + 𝜹𝟏𝑰(𝑰𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 ≤ 𝜸) + 𝜷𝟐𝑰𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕𝑰(𝑰𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 > 𝜸) + 𝜶𝒁𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (2.2) 
where the parameters 𝜇𝑖 and 𝛾 are individual effects and the threshold value, respectively; I(.) is 
the indicator function, 𝑦𝑖𝑡  (the Gini coefficient) is the dependent variable, 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡  (institutional 
quality) is the threshold variable, and 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is the m-dimensional vector of explanatory regressors, 
which may include lagged values of y and other endogenous variables. The vector of explanatory 
variables is partitioned into a subset 𝑍1𝑖𝑡  of exogenous variables uncorrelated with 𝑖𝑡  and a 
subset of endogenous variables 𝑍2𝑖𝑡  correlated with 𝑖𝑡 ; 𝛿1  is the regime intercept, which is 
common for all the cross-sections. 𝑖𝑡 is the error term assumed to be 𝑖𝑖𝑑 ∼ (0, 𝜎
2). The parameters 
𝛽1  and 𝛽2  represent the marginal impact of institutions on income inequality when the 
institutional quality value is below the threshold and above the threshold, respectively. Following 
Arellano and Bover (1995), the slope of the dynamic threshold regression is derived using the 
specifications of the generalized method of moments (GMM). The lag values of the endogenous 
variable, income inequality, are used as instruments to correct for endogeneity bias. We reduced 
the instrument count to 2 (p = 2) to avoid overfitting instrumented variables, which might lead to 
biased coefficient estimates. The next approach is to eliminate individual fixed effects, 𝜇𝑖 , without 
violating the underlying distributional assumptions of Hansen (1999, 2000) and Caner and 
Hansen (2004). As argued in Kremer, Bick, and Nautz (2013), applying a standard within 
transformation (Hansen 1999) to a dynamic model such as equation (2.2) leads to inconsistent 
estimates, as the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the mean of the individual errors. 
This also holds for all the transformed individual errors. However, using first-differencing also 
implies negative serial correlation of the error terms, which violates the underlying distribution 
theory developed by Hansen (1999), making it inapplicable to panel data. To solve this problem, 
Kremer et al. (2013) applied a forward orthogonal deviations transformation to eliminate 
individual fixed effects. The transformation ensures that the error terms in the model are not 
autocorrelated when applying Caner and Hansen’s (2004) cross-sectional threshold model to a 









(𝜺𝒊(𝒕 + 𝟏) + ⋯ + 𝜺𝒊𝑻)] 
The error term remains uncorrelated after applying the forward orthogonal deviation 
transformation, that is: 
𝑽𝒂𝒓(𝜺𝒊) = 𝝈
𝟐𝑰𝑻   ⇒ 𝑽𝒂𝒓(𝜺𝒊
∗) = 𝝈𝟐𝑰𝑻−𝟏 
To estimate the dynamic panel threshold model, Kremer et al. (2013) estimate a reduced-form 
regression for the endogenous variable 𝑍2𝑖𝑡 as a function of the instruments 𝑋𝑖𝑡  (Caner and 
Hansen, 2004). Ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to estimate equation 2.2 for a fixed threshold, 
γ, where 𝑍2𝑖𝑡 is substituted with its predicted values from the first-step regression. The residual 
sum of squares is denoted by 𝑆(γ), where γ is the common threshold value. The step is repeated 
for a strict subset of the support of the threshold variable 𝑞 from which, in the third step, the 
estimator of the threshold value γ is selected as the one associated with the smallest sum of 
squared residuals, that is, 𝛾 =  
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝛾
𝑆𝑛(γ). Following Hansen (1999) and Caner and Hansen 
(2004), the critical values for determining the 95% confidence interval of the threshold value are 
given by 
𝜞 = {𝜸 ∶ 𝑳𝑹(𝜸) ≤ 𝑪(𝜶)}, 
where C(α) is the 95% percentile of the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio statistic LR 
(γ). The likelihood ratio is adjusted to accommodate the number of time periods used for each 
cross-section. Once 𝛾 is determined, the slope coefficient is then estimated using the GMM. 
2.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
In this section of the paper, we present and discuss the results of the dynamic threshold 
regression. Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata., reports the baseline results for both 
advanced and developing economies using WBGI institutional quality indicators. The upper part 
of the tables displays the estimated institutional quality threshold, and the corresponding 95% 
confidence intervals. The middle part shows regime-dependent coefficients of institutional 
quality on income inequality. Parameters 𝛽1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽2  are the marginal effects of institutional 
quality on income inequality, below (above) the institutional regime, that is, when institutional 
quality is either below or above the estimated threshold value. The coefficients of the control 
variables are presented in the lower part of the tables. The institutional quality index is derived 
from the scores of the principal components of the three governance indicators namely 
government effectiveness, control of corruption and rule of law. The results are reported in 
Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata.. 
 The WBGI institutional index shows the inequality‐reducing effect is disproportionate, 
given the level of development. We find quadratic effect for advanced countries but a monotonic 
negative effect for developing countries, irrespective of whether developing country is below or 
above the threshold. The estimated threshold value of 0.1866 with a corresponding 95% 
confidence interval [0.1766, 0.6211] for advanced countries. The marginal effect shows a positive 
relationship between institutional quality and income inequality if institutional quality is below 
the threshold (𝛽1=  0.0416, p<0.01), and negative if institutional quality is above the threshold (𝛽2= 
-0.0071, p>0.1). In column 2 of Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata., however, the 
results show an estimated threshold value of 1.1889 and a corresponding 95% confidence interval 
of [1.1284, 1.2216] for our sample of developing economies. The marginal effect shows negative 
relationship between institutional quality and income inequality if institutional quality is below 
the threshold (𝛽1= -0.0320, p<0.01), and negative if institutional quality is above the threshold (𝛽2= 
-0.0310, p<0.01). Although this may appear counterintuitive, we argue that institutional reforms 
across the developing countries, particularly in the late 1990’s, may have triggered an inequality 
reducing effect, such that marginal improvements in the overall institutional development 
produced a positive impact for the reduction of poverty and inequality of opportunities to the 
extent that a larger negative effect of institutional quality is observed for countries with weak 
institutions. Example can be said of Mexico’s Progresa/Oportunidades which provided large-
scale, well-targeted program that makes transfers conditional on investments in human capital 
(World Bank 2001) and South Africa’s adoption of OECD guidelines in 2011 to control corruption 
in tenders and procurement processes in its public sector. Other reforms that also facilitated the 
eradication of barriers such as bureaucracy and regulatory inadequacies, were the financial sector 
reforms, public sector management reforms and structural adjustment reforms. There is also a 
convincing argument that the impact of institution on income distribution varies by indicators. 
After, applying the individual institutional variables in the same framework for both developed 
and developing economies.  
Table 2. 3: Results of WBGI Institution threshold 
Estimated threshold Advanced Countries Developing Countries 
𝜸 0.1865746 1.188985 
95% Confidence interval [0.1766168, 0.6211474] [1.128371, 1.221611] 
Impact of institutional quality Estimated Coefficient Estimated Coefficient 
𝜷𝟏     0.0416*** 
(0.0139) 




   -0.0310*** 
(0.0069) 
Impact of regime-independent regressors Estimated Coefficient Estimated Coefficient 
Lag of Gini 0.0018 
(0.0018) 
  0.0036* 
(0.0019) 
Real GDP per capita  -0.0314*    0.0404*** 
(0.0187) (0.0133) 




Human capital    0.0910*** 
(0.0158) 
   -0.1709*** 
(0.0161) 




𝜹𝟏    0.0708** 
(0.0281) 
    -0.0276*** 
(0.0060) 
Regime 1 204 524 
Regime 2 508 363 
Linearity test   
Wald test (LM)     33.101[0.000]      15.655 [0.016] 
Fisher test (F) 2653.563[0.000]  2037.703[0.000] 
Likelihood Ratio test (LM)     34.210[0.000]       15.803[0.015] 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels; Standard errors in parentheses 
 
The results are presented in Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. and Errore. 
L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata.. In the context of the advanced countries, we find that 
below the threshold, individual indicators are positively correlated with income inequality. 
Above the threshold, only rule of law is significant. Also, the results show a negative marginal 
effect of control of corruption on income inequality, but the association is not statistically 
significant. For developing countries, we find two divergent results. First, a quadratic effect for 
rule of law and control of corruption, and second, a negative monotonic association for 
government effectiveness. Although, developing economies are mostly found to exhibit weaker 
governance institutions, significant increase in the proportion of countries with surplus in 
government effectiveness occurred much earlier to support the several reforms that transformed 
some of these economies. This confirms our claim that the introduction of public sector reforms 
and structural adjustment policies that eliminated bureaucracy and reduced procurement 
breaches in the public sector had significant impact on the institutional environment in the 
developing world. This  finding is in line with evidence from  (Gradstein & Chong, 2004) who 
also found that government effectiveness has the largest impact (among all the WGI governance 
indicators) on income inequality  in developing countries. This may be attributed to the fact that 
the World Banks’s focus on developing countries have remained on trying to find accountability 
and transparency in the public sectors. We do not neglect the argument of prior studies on the 
choice of governance indicators as most institutional quality measures are “subjective” and based 
on expert assessment and opinions that may be biased (see Knack and Keefer 1995). Also, there 
is a concern among prior studies over the comparability of the WBGI governance indicators 
overtime and across countries (Bardhan 2008). Since the WBGI is also based on expert perceptions 
and opinions rather than actual institutional development, we replaced the WBGI institutional 
quality index with ICRG institutional quality index.  
In column 1 of Comparatively, while the results suggest the presence of a quadratic or 
Kuznets inverted U-shaped relationship between institutional quality and income inequality for 
developing economies, we find that the threshold value for developing countries is higher than 
that of advanced countries, suggesting that more effort is needed for developing economies to 
reach a higher level of institutional quality, that is, income inequality reducing. This is because 
institutional quality in the developing countries is far from optimum (Lee and Kim, 2009; Perera 
and Lee, 2013; Adams and Klobodu, 2016). This evidence is particularly consistent with existing 
literature, which demonstrates that well-defined institutions are important for efficient resource 
allocation and redistribution (Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya, 2006; Gyimah-Brempong & Muñoz, 2006; 
North, 1990). According to the 95% confidence interval, for developing economies to minimize 
income inequality, the conclusion at least holds for high institutional quality. This contradicts 
evidence from Perera and Lee (2013) for developing economies but supports the findings of recent 
studies, such as Aiyar and Ebeke (2019), Hartmann et al., (2017), Jauch and Watzka (2016), and 
Brunori et al. (2013), who show that weak institutions have a deleterious impact on income 
distribution in developing economies. The negative institution-inequality relationship also 
supports the broad theoretical arguments of new institutional economics (Acemoglu & Johnson, 
2005), and empirical evidence from Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Gwama, (2014) and 
Gundlach and Paldam (2009), that implies strong institutions are necessary to moderate income 
inequality by improving the efficiency of desired resource allocation and distribution for 
economic prosperity. 
 
 we report an estimated threshold value of 0.3579 with a corresponding 95% confidence 
interval [0.1484, 0.3579] for advanced countries. The marginal effect shows a positive relationship 
between institutional quality and income inequality if institutional quality is below the threshold 
(𝛽1=  0.0361, p<0.01), and negative if institutional quality is above the threshold (𝛽2= -0.0233, 
p<0.01). Qualitatively, we find quadratic relationship for the advanced economies which bears 
resemblance to our findings in Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata.. In column 2 of 
Comparatively, while the results suggest the presence of a quadratic or Kuznets inverted U-
shaped relationship between institutional quality and income inequality for developing 
economies, we find that the threshold value for developing countries is higher than that of 
advanced countries, suggesting that more effort is needed for developing economies to reach a 
higher level of institutional quality, that is, income inequality reducing. This is because 
institutional quality in the developing countries is far from optimum (Lee and Kim, 2009; Perera 
and Lee, 2013; Adams and Klobodu, 2016). This evidence is particularly consistent with existing 
literature, which demonstrates that well-defined institutions are important for efficient resource 
allocation and redistribution (Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya, 2006; Gyimah-Brempong & Muñoz, 2006; 
North, 1990). According to the 95% confidence interval, for developing economies to minimize 
income inequality, the conclusion at least holds for high institutional quality. This contradicts 
evidence from Perera and Lee (2013) for developing economies but supports the findings of recent 
studies, such as Aiyar and Ebeke (2019), Hartmann et al., (2017), Jauch and Watzka (2016), and 
Brunori et al. (2013), who show that weak institutions have a deleterious impact on income 
distribution in developing economies. The negative institution-inequality relationship also 
supports the broad theoretical arguments of new institutional economics (Acemoglu & Johnson, 
2005), and empirical evidence from Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Gwama, (2014) and 
Gundlach and Paldam (2009), that implies strong institutions are necessary to moderate income 
inequality by improving the efficiency of desired resource allocation and distribution for 
economic prosperity. 
 
, however, the results show an estimated threshold value of 2.1652 and a corresponding 
95% confidence interval of [1.0819, 2.1652] for our sampled developing economies. The marginal 
effect shows a positive relationship between institutional quality and income inequality if the 
quality of institution is below the threshold (𝛽1= 0.0179, p<0.01), and negative if the quality of 
institution is above the threshold (𝛽2= -0.0168, p<0.01).
Table 2. 4: Results of the individual WBGI institution threshold for advanced countries 
Estimated threshold Government Effectiveness Control of Corruption Rule of Law 
𝛄 1.7955 2.2363 2.2746 
95% Confidence interval [1.7471, 2.2705] [1.2508, 2.3782] [1.9094, 2.4186] 
Impact of institutional quality Estimated Coefficient Estimated Coefficient Estimated Coefficient 
𝛃𝟏    0.0914*** 
(0.0279) 










Impact of regime-independent regressors Estimated Coefficient Estimated Coefficient Estimated Coefficient 
Lag of Gini 0.0018 
(0.0018) 
















Human capital    0.0910*** 
(0.0158) 










𝜹𝟏    -0.0794*** 
(0.0148) 




Regime 1 37 142 157 
Regime 2 508 403 388 
Linearity test    
Wald test (LM)     33.100[0.000]      27.780[0.000] 27.618[0.000] 
Fisher test (F) 2653.526[0.000]  2227.022[0.000] 2214.038[0.000] 
Likelihood Ratio test (LM)     34.209[0.000]       28.556[0.000] 28.385[0.000] 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels; Standard errors in parentheses 
Table 2. 5: Results of the individual WBGI institution threshold for developing countries 
Estimated threshold Government Effectiveness Control of Corruption Rule of Law 
𝛄 0.9293 0.8039 1.4168 
95% Confidence interval [0.9043, 0.9425] [0.8026, 0.8569] [1.2770, 1.6815] 
Impact of institutional quality Estimated Coefficient Estimated Coefficient Estimated Coefficient 
𝛃𝟏    -0.0614*** 
(0.0128) 










Impact of regime-independent regressors Estimated Coefficient Estimated Coefficient Estimated Coefficient 
Lag of Gini 0.0036* 
(0.0019) 
















Human capital    -0.1709*** 
(0.0161) 










𝜹𝟏    -0.0279*** 
(0.0058) 




Regime 1 524 614 754 
Regime 2 363 273 133 
Linearity test    
Wald test (LM)     15.655[0.016]      51.250[0.000] 21.369[0.002] 
Fisher test (F) 2037.746[0.000]  6671.031[0.000] 2781.473[0.000] 
Likelihood Ratio test (LM)     15.803[0.015]       52.886[0.000] 21.646[0.001] 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels; Standard errors in parentheses
Comparatively, while the results suggest the presence of a quadratic or Kuznets inverted U-
shaped relationship between institutional quality and income inequality for developing 
economies, we find that the threshold value for developing countries is higher than that of 
advanced countries, suggesting that more effort is needed for developing economies to reach a 
higher level of institutional quality, that is, income inequality reducing. This is because 
institutional quality in the developing countries is far from optimum (Lee and Kim, 2009; Perera 
and Lee, 2013; Adams and Klobodu, 2016). This evidence is particularly consistent with existing 
literature, which demonstrates that well-defined institutions are important for efficient resource 
allocation and redistribution (Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya, 2006; Gyimah-Brempong & Muñoz, 2006; 
North, 1990). According to the 95% confidence interval, for developing economies to minimize 
income inequality, the conclusion at least holds for high institutional quality. This contradicts 
evidence from Perera and Lee (2013) for developing economies but supports the findings of recent 
studies, such as Aiyar and Ebeke (2019), Hartmann et al., (2017), Jauch and Watzka (2016), and 
Brunori et al. (2013), who show that weak institutions have a deleterious impact on income 
distribution in developing economies. The negative institution-inequality relationship also 
supports the broad theoretical arguments of new institutional economics (Acemoglu & Johnson, 
2005), and empirical evidence from Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Gwama, (2014) and 
Gundlach and Paldam (2009), that implies strong institutions are necessary to moderate income 
inequality by improving the efficiency of desired resource allocation and distribution for 
economic prosperity. 
 
Table 2. 6: Results of ICRG institution threshold 
Estimated threshold Advanced Countries Developing Countries 
𝜸 0.3578931 2.165184 
95% Confidence interval [0.1484064, 0.3578995] [1.081901, 2.16524] 
Impact of institutional quality Estimated Coefficient Estimated Coefficient 
𝜷𝟏  0.0361*** 
(0.0132) 




   -0.0168*** 
(0.0041) 
Impact of regime-independent regressors Estimated Coefficient Estimated Coefficient 
Lag of Gini 0.0033* 
(0.0018) 
   0.0039* 
(0.0021) 
Real GDP per capita  -0.0076 
(0.0172) 
  0.0161 
(0.0147) 




Human capital    0.0744*** 
(0.0143) 
   -0.1504*** 
(0.0170) 








Regime 1 131 756 
Regime 2 414 131 
Linearity test   
Wald test (LM)     41.882[0.000]      66.540[0.000] 
Fisher test (F) 3357.501[0.000]  8661.306[0.000] 
Likelihood Ratio test (LM)     43.679[0.000]       69.334[0.000] 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels; Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Consistent with prior studies and theoretical expectations (e.g. Dulani et al., 2013; Bergh 
and Nilsson 2010), we find a significantly positive relationship between real GDP per capita and 
income inequality, suggesting that sustainable economic development in developing economies 
is not inclusive, given the level of institutional quality. Weak institutional mechanisms worsen 
the impact of economic development, thereby deteriorating income distributions. In contrast, we 
find evidence of a negative relationship between income per capita and income inequality for the 
advanced economies, but the result is only statistically significant in the model with the World 
Bank institutional quality index. The coefficient of fiscal policy is negatively correlated with 
income inequality, but it is not statistically significant. Regarding the effect of human capital 
development, the results are positive for advanced economies, implying an average increase in 
the returns on human capital investment (Carter, 2007; Berggren, 1999). However, the negative 
human capital – income inequality nexus for developing economies also suggests that large 
expansions in literacy in most developing countries have clearly reached the lowest income 
groups and as more productive workers are rewarded with higher wages (Castelló and 
Doménech, 2012; Checchi, 2001). These results are significant at the 1% level. In addition, we find 
a positive relationship between trade openness and income inequality. This supports the political 
economy argument that the elite gain the most from trade globalization, while the risks are shared 
by a larger group at the bottom of the income distribution. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Bergh and Nilsson (2010). 
 
 2.5 Concluding remarks 
Extant literature has highlighted the crucial role of institutions in economic development, but not 
much has been done empirically, to investigate the existence of an institutional quality threshold 
effect on income distribution, which is the main contribution of this study. Using data from 52 
developing countries from 1996 to 2017, we investigated whether there exists an institutional 
quality threshold affects income inequality. Another contribution of this study is adopting a 
regression based on the concept of a threshold effect advanced by Kremer et al. (2013) to take 
advantage of the rich dynamics in the relationship between institutions and income distributions. 
Our findings show that the inequality‐reducing effect is disproportionate, given the level of 
institutional quality. More specifically, when institutional quality is measured by the WBGI 
proxy, we find quadratic effect for advanced countries but a monotonic and negative effect for 
developing countries, irrespective of whether developing countries are below or above the 
threshold. As discussed in the section 1.4.3 and 1.5, the results of the WGI may be attributed to 
the “subjective“ nature of the governance indicators as emphasized in prior studies such as Knack 
& Keefer (1995) and Bekaert et al. (2005). Also, the strong impact of government effectiveness on 
income inequality may reiterate the fact that all efforts of international institutions particularly 
the World Bank to addresses institutional lapses in developing countries were solely focused on 
streamlining transparency and accountability in public institutions and as such may have 
influence significantly our findings. This evidence was also reported in (Gradstein & Chong, 
2004) for developing countries. Also, our findings revealed that, for developing countries 
government effectiveness had more influence on the institutional environment while rule of law 
contributes significantly to the institutional environment of advanced countries. However, when 
the ICRG‐based measure of institutions is used as the threshold variable, we find a quadratic 
association between institutions and income inequality for both the advanced and developing 
countries. Theoretically, our empirical findings validate the existence of a non-linear relationship 
between institutions and income inequality which confirms recent arguments of an augmented 
Kuznets inverted U-shaped curve relationship between institutions and income inequality 
(Chong & Calderón, 2000;Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000). This 
finding also supports the theoretical argument of the new institutional economics (Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005).  
The implication of our results suggest that institutional development enhances policy 
efforts to reduce income inequality. Thus, a better institutional environment allows for the 
exploitation of the full benefits associated with a country’s institutional development. As such 
progressivity towards equitable redistribution of resources matters, where better institutional 
quality, such as property rights, is potent in ensuring that long-run economic growth trickles 
down to the ordinary people. More specifically, when institutional quality is below the optimal 
level, we find that institutions tend to distort income inequality, by reducing policy efforts. Weak 
institutions encourage extra-legal activities and thereby offer opulence in the hands of a limited 
few. For countries with institutions above the threshold, we find that better institutional quality 
is associated with lower income inequality, suggesting that building on progressively strong 
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Appendix 2. 1: Description of variables 
Variable Description Source 
Gini Coefficient (Gini) Gini index of disposable income  SWIID 
GDP per capita (GDPC) Gross domestic product per capita, constant prices 
(PPP; 2011 international dollars) 
IMF 
Fiscal policy  Net lending (+)/borrowing (–) of the general 
government 
IMF 
Trade openness (OPN) Exports and imports of goods (% of GDP) WDI 
Human capital index (HCI) Returns to mean years of schooling PWT 9.1 
Institutions ICRG Principal component scores for bureaucratic quality, 
control of corruption and rule of law 
 
The variables are weighted as, 
1. Bureaucratic quality on a scale of 4,  
2. Control of corruption on a scale of 6 and  
3. Rule of law (law and order) on a scale of 
6. 
ICRG 
Institutions WBGI Principal component scores for government 
effectiveness, control of corruption and rule of law 
 
1. The governance indicators are constructed 
from expert opinions and various surveys 
including (Public sector organizations, 
Surveys of households and firms, 
Commercial business information providers 
and Non-governmental organizations). 
2. These are then rescaled between 0 and 1.  
3. The resulting output is further weighted 
using an Unobserved Components Model 
(UCM).  
4. The final composite indicator runs from -2.5 










CHAPTER 3: FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIES: DOES THE MEASURE OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT MATTER? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was to minimize global poverty by half—a 
goal that was met five years ahead of time. According to the World Bank, the number of people 
in extreme poverty decreased by 114 million between 2012 and 2013. More strikingly, extreme 
poverty declined from 35 percent of the global population in 1990 to 10 percent in 2015 (UNDP, 
2016). Accompanying this success story was the financial system that provided “fertile ground” 
for achieving the development goals, following the 2002 Monterrey Consensus. Halfway through 
the 15-year time span of the MDGs, the world was plagued with a catastrophic financial crisis 
that impacted the progress of some of the development goals. Policymakers had to overcome the 
structural challenges of the financial crisis to achieve the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goal 
(SDG) regarding poverty eradication. This included mobilizing domestic financial resources to 
support transforming the private sector for sustainable development (Cihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Feyen, & Levine, 2012). Theoretically, there is a consensus that countries with more highly 
developed financial systems grow faster and reduce poverty (Jalilian & Kirkpatrick, 2002; 
Honohan, 2004; Jeanneney & Kpodar, 2011). Recent evidence, however, shows that a positive 
finance–growth nexus does not necessarily mean financial development can explain poverty 
reduction (Beck et al., 2007; Seven & Coskun, 2016; Kaidi & Mensi, 2017; Rewilak, 2017). A review 
of the extant literature shows that many studies have empirically explored the finance–poverty 
nexus (Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2002, 2005; Beck et al., 2007; Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011; Seven 
& Coskun, 2016; Rashid and Intartaglia, 2017; Ayyagari et al., 2020). However, these studies 
generally offer mixed findings, and the results remain inconclusive.  
A common premise in such studies is the use of economy-wide financial development 
measures that fail to capture how different financial institutions contribute to poverty alleviation 
in developing countries. One such failure is excluding non-formal financial institutions such as 
microfinance institutions from the measure of financial development. Little is known about the 
overall finance–poverty relationship via the contributions of microfinance in the financial sector. 
Empirical studies are silent on the unbalanced sectoral effect of the financial system on poverty 
reduction. The data show that microfinance institutions provide access to financial services for 
over 200 million clients who cannot obtain credit from traditional banks, an essential path out of 
poverty (Donou-Adonsou & Sylwester, 2016). In addition, the poverty indicators used in these 
studies are one-dimensional and do not reflect the different forms of deprivation experienced by 
the poor. Meanwhile, evidence from the MDGs shows that poverty should be understood as a 
multidimensional or multi-faceted human problem (Hulme & Fukuda-Parr, 2009). Banerjee and 
Duflo (2007) also show that the poor spend their money not only on consumption but also on 
lifecycle needs, including health, investment in education, and asset ownership, which the poor 
cannot easily acquire via the formal financial system. Microfinance institutions provide this 
opportunity because they are mandated to reach the socially excluded who lack access to 
mainstream sources of finance. Following in the footsteps of the poverty-lending approach, this 
study focuses on the theme that the extent to which financial development affects poverty in 
developing countries depends on the simultaneous impact of credit provided by both traditional 
and non-traditional financial institutions. 
Our study differs from earlier works in several ways. First, we contribute to the finance–poverty 
literature by using three different poverty measures. The first two measures are the poverty 
headcount and poverty gap. Researchers of poverty have mostly relied on the micro-data to 
estimate multidimensional poverty. We distinguish our study from prior research by using a 
newly constructed multidimensional measure that encompasses the various aspects of poverty 
outlined in Alkire and Santos (2014), Alkire and Foster (2009), and Banerjee and Duflo (2007). The 
indicators primarily used in prior studies are narrow in definition and may not directly describe 
all aspects of poverty. Therefore, we estimate a multidimensional poverty index using a recently 
developed macro-level deprivation database from washdata.org to capture the various 
dimensions of deprivation, a novelty of this study. Second, most finance–poverty research focuses 
on economy-wide financial development indicators, failing to capture contributions from the 
other sources of finance mostly used by the poor, such as microfinance institutions. In this study, 
we conduct a comparative analysis of the contribution of commercial banks and microfinance 
institutions to poverty reduction. The findings of the study reveal that the impact of financial 
development on poverty depends on the measures of poverty and financial development 
indicators. We find that all the alternative financial development indicators employed in the 
models are negatively correlated with the multidimensional poverty index; only the microfinance 
proxies of financial development appear to have a strong impact. A further investigation also 
revealed that it is access to finance, the only social performance goal, that has negative impact on 
poverty reduction. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant literature. 
Section 3 discusses the data and econometric methods used in the study. Section 4 provides a 
discussion of the empirical findings, and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 3.2 Recent studies on financial development and poverty reduction 
Theories that examine the effect of financial development on poverty reduction generally offer 
favorable predictions (Levine, 2005). One such theory is the trickle-down effect, which argues that 
a well-functioning financial system would increases poverty reduction by promoting economic 
growth (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Beck et al. 2007). The trickle-down theory is widely 
supported by previous studies such as Fan et al. (2000), Dollar and Aart (2002), and Ravallion and 
Datt (2002). Analogous to the favorable conditions established in theoretical studies, the empirical 
literature has also suggested that financial development contributes to poverty alleviation in 
several ways. First, a well-developed financial system enables efficient allocation of capital, and 
reduces of borrowing and financing constraints, such as information asymmetry and high fixed 
cost for small borrowers (Jalilian & Kirkpatrick, 2005). Second, financial development fosters free 
choice, enabling the underprivileged to access funds for growing businesses, which are linked to 
more jobs, income growth, and poverty reduction (Jauch & Watzka, 2016; Odhiambo, 2009). Some 
of the studies that sought to examine the relationship between financial development and poverty 
reduction include, but are not limited to Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2002, 2005), Beck et al., (2007), 
Arestis and Caner (2009), Odhiambo (2009, 2010), Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) and Zhang and 
Ben Naceur (2019). Although there is a wide range of studies on the finance-poverty relationship, 
the empirical evidence is mixed. For example, Ayyagari et al., (2020) found evidence of a strong 
negative relationship between financial depth and rural poverty in India. The authors also found 
that financial deepening induced a more significant reduction in rural poverty than financial 
outreach. Using national survey data covering 45,000 Indian households for the periods 2016 and 
2017, Churchill and Marisetty (2020) also found that financial inclusion had a strong poverty-
reduction effect, irrespective of the poverty indicators used in the study. In a bid to “unmask” the 
relationship between finance and poverty, Zhang and Ben Naceur (2019) identified three different 
effects of financial development on poverty. First, they found that four out of five dimensions of 
financial development used in the study, including access, depth, efficiency, and stability, 
reduced inequality and poverty. Second, financial liberalization tends to exacerbate inequalities 
and poverty. Third, compared to the stock market, developing the banking sector has had a 
stronger impact on income distribution. In reviewing the mechanism through which liquidity 
reduces inequality and poverty, Blau (2018) found that liquidity-induced wage growth strongly 
moderated the effect of both income inequality and poverty. Using GMM on panel data from 120 
developing economies from 1980 to 2013, Inoue (2018) investigated the impact of financial 
development and remittances on poverty conditions in developing economies. Inoue observed 
that both financial development and remittance flows in developing economies have poverty-
reducing effects. Accordingly, Inoue concluded that remittances can replace financial 
development in many developing economies as a tool in the poverty alleviation process. Ho and 
Iyke (2018) investigated the so-called trickle-down hypothesis for China using macro-level data 
from 1985 to 2014. The authors found support for a three-way relationship between financial 
development, economic growth, and poverty reduction at the national level. Kaidi and Mensi 
(2017) found that financial development failed to reach the poorest segment of society in a sample 
of 138 countries from 1980 to 2014. Similarly, Rashid and Intartaglia (2017) used data from 1985 
to 2008 and a two-step system GMM estimator and found that financial development played a 
significant role in reducing absolute poverty, but not when poverty was measured in relative 
terms. The authors also found that the effect of financial development on poverty reduction was 
significant only when liquid liabilities and private credit were used as measures of financial 
development. Rewilak (2017) also observed that both financial deepening and increased physical 
access are beneficial for reducing the headcount poverty ratio. The author further observed that 
using alternative indicators of financial instability led to an increase in the incidence of poverty. 
Using microfinance gross loans to GDP and microfinance credit to GDP as measures of financial 
development, Donou-Adonsou and Sylwester (2016) assessed the impact of financial 
development on poverty reduction in developing countries between 2002 and 2011. The authors 
found that financial development via microfinance institutions does not appear to have any 
significant impact on poverty reduction. Their findings were robust in terms of poverty measures 
and financial development. Banerjee and Jackson (2016) found that microfinance increased the 
level of indebtedness among already impoverished people. Boukhatem (2016) investigated the 
contribution of financial development to poverty reduction in 67 low and middle-income 
economies from 1986 to 2012. The findings showed that instability in the financial systems of 
developing economies tends to eliminate positive gains from financial development and thus 
ends up penalizing the poor. Applying a dynamic panel estimation technique and a recent dataset 
covering 1987–2011, Seven and Coskun (2016) assessed the financial inequality–poverty nexus in 
emerging economies. The authors revealed that in their sampled emerging economies, financial 
development promoted economic growth but not poverty reduction. Using a dynamic panel OLS 
estimation technique on data from South Asian economies between 1990 and 2013, Sehrawat and 
Giri (2016) showed that financial development and economic growth reduced poverty in South 
Asian countries, but rural–urban income inequality aggravated poverty. Employing the 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model, Abosedra et al. (2016) concluded that financial 
development contributed to poverty reduction in Egypt only when private credit was used as a 
proxy for financial development. Uddin et al. (2014) looked at the relationship between financial 
development, economic growth, and poverty reduction in Bangladesh using quarterly data from 
1975 to 2011. They found a non-linear relationship between financial development and poverty. 
Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) pointed out that while the poor benefited from financial 
development through the McKinnon “conduit effect,” they tend not to gain from greater credit 
availability. The authors also found that financial instability significantly hindered efforts aimed 
at reducing poverty in developing economies. Kondo et al. (2008) show that microfinance had no 
statistically significant impact on household assets or human capital investments, such as health 
and education. As such, the effect of an increase in microfinance portfolios on the incomes and 
consumption of the poor does not necessitate a pro-poor approach to poverty alleviation in 
developing economies if the impact of microfinance does not cover all aspects of poverty. 
 
 
 3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Measures of poverty and financial development 
In practice, there are different approaches to measuring poverty, but according to Ravallion and 
Lokshin (2003), the methodological approach is very important for policy implications. A 
common approach adopted in the literature is to count the number of people living on 
consumption expenditures or income levels below a threshold where food energy intake is just 
sufficient to sustain life (Ravallion & Chen, 2019; Ravallion & Lokshin, 2003). Given the above 
classical approach to poverty measurement, Beck et al. (2007) adopted a poverty line of $1.00 per 
day, chosen in part because of its proximity to the poverty lines used by many poor countries. In 
contrast, Ravallion et al. (2009) used a poverty line of $2 per day, which corresponded to the 
median income of the countries sampled in their study. Along with these conceptualizations, the 
World Bank defined a more conventional international poverty line that was set at $1.90 per day 
(2011 PPP) in 2015. The poverty line was anticipated to preserve the real purchasing power of the 
old poverty line of $1.25 a day (2005 PPP) in the world’s poorest regions (Reddy & Rahul, 2016). 
In this study, we focus on three poverty measures: a headcount index, the poverty gap, and a 
multidimensional poverty index. The first two measures—headcount index and poverty gap—
are both based on the international poverty line of $1.90 a day. Due to the limitations of the 
headcount index5, we included the poverty gap index. The poverty gap index measures the depth 
of poverty by considering how far the poor are from a given poverty line. All these indicators 
were obtained from the World Bank’s poverty and equity database (Povcalnet). Previous studies, 
                                                          
5 The headcount poverty index counts all people below the poverty line without considering the depth of 
poverty. 
including but not limited to Alkire and Foster (2009, 2011), Nolan and Whelan (2010), Alkire and 
Roche (2012), Alkire and Santos (2014), Chen et al. (2019), and Whelan et al. (2019), have criticized 
income or consumption-based poverty measures, arguing that they do not cover the overall living 
conditions of households because of their narrow definitions. According to Alkire and Foster 
(2009), the multidimensional poverty index is made up of several lists of deprivations 
experienced by the poor over their lifetimes. These include poor health, lack of education, and 
inadequate living standards. Deriving a multi-dimensional index comes with difficulty. 
Particularly, while a priori and in theory selecting the individual as the unit of identification is a 
preferred option, in practice it entails several difficulties (conceptual applicability of indicators to 
different subgroups and data availability) that seem to justify using the household as the unit of 
identification as a second-best option. Also, the issue of an applicable weighting scheme is 
problematic as most multi-dimensional poverty indices differ by country due to the national 
priorities. Also, multi-dimensional indicators are computed from micro-level indicators, but these 
surveys generally do not collect information on all indicators at the individual level and also are 
not conducted each year. The novelty of our study is that we estimate a multidimensional poverty 
index using macro-level data that captures these deprivations. Principal component analysis is 
used to reduce the deprivation variables into a single variable. The principal component is used 
instead of the additive approach because the additive approach can result in a biased composite 
indicator, which may not entirely reflect the true information of its individual indicators. Also, 
the associated weights may not be desirable or difficult to verify. Another limitation of the 
additive method is its full compensability i.e., poor performance in some indicators can be 
compensated by sufficiently high values of other indicators. We then normalized the score of the 
principal component into an index of range between 0 and 1 using a min-max normalization 
approach6. Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. lists the theoretical constructs of our 
multidimensional poverty index and the corresponding variables that were used7. We report the 
results of individual sampling adequacy based on the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test. The 
overall test shows a sampling adequacy of 90.33%. 
Table 3. 1: Items selected for the multidimensional poverty index 
Dimension Indicators KMO Source 
Health Prevalence of undernourishment (% of pop.) 0.9193 WDI 
Child under 5 mortality  0.8688 
UNICEF 
Child between 4 - 14 mortality 0.8543 
Education Mean years of schooling 0.9238 UNDP 
Children out of school (% of primary school age) 0.8766 WDI 
Living Standard Population without access to clean cooking fuel 0.8946 WDI 
Unimproved sanitation 0.8860 Washdata.org 
Unimproved drinking water 0.9564 Washdata.org 
Population without access to electricity 0.9057 WDI 
Per capita household consumption expenditure  0.9223 WDI 
Note: Overall KMO = 0.9033, Bartlett’s sphericity =0.000 
 
To measure financial development, we rely on indicators of financial development that relate to 
economic growth and are commonly used in the literature (Beck et al., 2007). We use two proxies: 
private credit to GDP and commercial bank assets to GDP. The advantage of these proxies over 
alternative financial development indicators is their importance to financial intermediation, a 
channel for private sector financing. As such, we further explore other alternative proxies rarely 
used in the literature: assets to GDP and gross loan portfolios of microfinance institutions to 
                                                          




7 See Appendix 3.2 for the summary of the descriptive statistics of the variables.  
GDP8. Microfinance institutions differ from mainstream banking in that they receive most of their 
financing from external loans, grants, or investors (Donou-Adonsou & Sylwester, 2016). 
Microfinance institutions primarily provide “microcredit” financial services to the poor (Donou-
Adonsou & Sylwester, 2016; Khandker, 2005). Data on private credit and commercial bank assets 
were taken from the Global Financial Development Database (Beck et al., 2000; Cihák et al., 2012). 
We extract microfinance data from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) database. We 
control for the effect of income inequality, income, and government spending (see  
  
                                                          












 , where F is credit or assets; Pe is end-of-
period CPI, and Pa is average annual CPI (see Beck et al., 2013; Donou-Adonsou & Sylwester, 2016). 
Appendix 3. 1 for variable descriptions). 
3.3.2. Empirical model and estimation strategy 
We use the basic growth–poverty model suggested by Ravallion (1997) and Ravallion and Chen 
(1997) to conduct our empirical estimation. The empirical model is written as; 
log 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 log 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 log 𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 log 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(𝑖 = 1; … ; 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1; … ; 𝑇𝑖)                         (3.1)    
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the measure of poverty in country 𝑖  at time 𝑡 ; 𝜇𝑖𝑡  represents the financial 
development indicator; 𝛽2  is the elasticity of poverty to income inequality given the Gini 
coefficient, 𝑔; 𝛽3  is the elasticity of poverty to variable 𝑥𝑖𝑡  (government spending); 𝛼𝑖  denotes 
time fixed effects; and 𝜖 is the error term. In Eq. (1), the coefficients (𝛽𝑖) are elasticities. As Adams 
and Page (2005) pointed out, the model assumes that income inequality is related to poverty 
reduction. In this model, Ravallion (1997) also shows that economic growth (proxied by income 
per capita) is more potent for reducing poverty in low inequality countries. Therefore, the 
relationship between poverty and income per capita is expected to be negative and significant. 
The finance–poverty nexus is ambiguous, as there is no clear-cut relationship in the literature. 
However, we expect a better-developed financial system to reduce poverty through pro-poor 
economic growth and development (Jalilian & Kirkpatrick, 2002, 2005; Beck et al., 2007). We 
estimate Eq. (3.1) using pooled OLS, which assumes that the covariates in the model are 
exogenous. For sensitivity analysis and endogeneity concerns, we estimate both instrumental 
variables (2SLS) and system GMM regression. We employ instruments that are frequently used 
in the finance literature: ethnic, language, and religious fractionalization, and the lags of financial 
development indicators. The theoretical literature has established that institutional quality 
(protection of property rights) is considered one of the most important pillars of a capitalist 
economy. As such, well-defined property rights is an important determinant of economic growth 
and therefore poverty reduction through efficient allocation of resources and investment (Bekaert 
et al., 2005). Therefore, we include the rule of law as an additional instrument. An economy with 
poor respect for the rule of law may increase opportunistic behavior that disproportionately 
benefits the rich. We also include the lag of an index from the Fraser Institute, which measures 
the extent of credit allocation between the government and the private sector (credit market 
regulation). The more government borrowing there is, the lower the amount of credit available 
to finance private projects. In the IV and System GMM estimations, the credibility of the estimates 
depends on the appropriateness of the instruments. Therefore, we test the validity of the 
instruments using the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis supports the overall validity of the instruments. We use balanced panel data covering 
49 developing countries 9  from 2000 to 2017. However, the number of observations varies 
depending on the available data for the poverty measures. 
3.4 Empirical Results  
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
In this section, we present the results of the summary statistics and the correlation matrix. Errore. 
L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. presents a summary of the descriptive statistics. The 
                                                          
9  Countries included in the study are Albania, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mali, Kyrgyzstan, North Macedonia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Nepal, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, and Viet Nam. 
results indicate that private credit as a percentage of GDP averaged 28.56% with a minimum and 
maximum of 1.32% and 120.80%, respectively. Bank assets as a percentage of GDP averaged 
33.33%. The average for microfinance assets as a percentage of GDP is 0.11%, while microfinance 
credit as a percentage of GDP averaged 0.06%. We record a mean headcount poverty index of 
15.21% and a poverty gap of 5.43% from 2000 to 2017. The multidimensional poverty index also 
shows significant variations with a mean index of 0.40. 
Table 3. 2: Summary Statistics of all variables 
Variable Obs Mean SD. Min Max 
Multi-dimensional Poverty 882 0.40 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Headcount ($1.90 a day) 390 15.21 18.92 0.00 85.96 
Poverty gap ($1.90 a day) 390 5.43 8.10 0.00 46.11 
Per capita GDP 882 6,328.02 5,170.30 630.68 30,454.76 
Gini 390 42.25 9.40 24.03 64.76 
Government spending 882 23.54 7.60 9.49 61.71 
MFI credit (% of GDP) 789 0.06 0.28 0.00 5.85 
MFI asset (% of GDP) 788 0.11 0.62 0.00 13.10 
Private credit (% of GDP) 880 28.56 21.95 1.32 120.80 
Bank asset (% of GDP) 881 33.33 28.96 1.60 160.13 
Credit market regulations 853 8.14 2.04 0.00 10.00 
Rule of law 882 -0.60 0.43 -1.94 0.58 
Ethnic Fractionalization 882 0.58 0.23 0.05 0.93 
Language Fractionalization 846 0.54 0.31 0.02 0.92 
Religious Fractionalization 882 0.44 0.22 0.07 0.86 
 
Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. reports the Pearson correlation matrix. Due to 
the high correlations between our financial development indicators, we treat them separately in 
the model to avoid multicollinearity issues. We proceed to estimate Eq. (1), using pooled country-
year observations in a balanced panel. To assess the finance-poverty relationship, we estimate 
several specifications of our model, each one focusing on a specific financial development 
indicator across the three different measures of poverty. Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata 
trovata. and Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. show the empirical results using 
pooled OLS with time-fixed effects. While the OLS regression does not control for endogeneity, 
we still report the results for the sake of comparison.  
Table 3. 3: Results of the correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. MFIC 1.0000       
2. MFIA 0.9829 1.0000      
3. BASSET 0.1363 0.1087 1.0000     
4. PCREDIT 0.1071 0.0787 0.9830 1.0000    
5. RGDP 0.0775 0.0434 0.5306 0.5527 1.0000   
6. CGOV 0.1995 0.1952 0.2676 0.2736 0.0442 1.0000  
7. GINI 0.0073 -0.0070 0.0909 0.1088 0.0286 -0.3004 1.0000 
 
Consistent with prior studies, including Ravallion (1997), Adams and Page (2005), Donou-
Adonsou and Sylwester (2016), and Zhang and Ben Naceur (2019), we find that income per capita 
reduces poverty while income inequality increases poverty. The results also show a negative 
relationship between government expenditure and the poverty measures. These results are 
significant at conventional levels. In the finance–poverty relationship, we also find a negative 
relationship between microfinance indicators of financial development (MFIC and MFIA) and all 
poverty measures; both enter the model with significant coefficients. While the traditional 
financial development indicators (PCREDIT and BASSET) are negatively correlated with all 
poverty indicators, we find that the relationship is not statistically significant when we consider 
the multidimensional poverty index. 

























































Observation 354 355 354 355 354 355 
Adjusted R2 0.787 0.784 0.718 0.719 0.719 0.719 
F-Statistics 330.897*** 326.331*** 230.199*** 230.913*** 231.239*** 231.605*** 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Standard Error in parentheses 
 
 

























































Observations 389 388 389 388 389 388 
Adjusted R2 0.775 0.776 0.695 0.701 0.699 0.702 
F-Statistic 339.726*** 340.712*** 226.344*** 231.632*** 230.172*** 232.918*** 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Standard Errors in parentheses 
 
To avoid endogeneity problems, we re-estimate Eq. (3.1) using a fixed-effects panel instrumental 
variables regression. The instruments included are ethnic, language, and religious 
fractionalization; the rule of law; lag of credit market regulation; and lags of the financial 
development indicators. To verify the validity of the instruments used in the IV regression, we 
use Hansen’s test of overidentifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis, the included 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and the excluded instruments are valid (Beck 
et al., 2007). A rejection of the null hypothesis validates the instruments. The results of the Hansen 
p-values suggest that the validity of the instruments is not rejected. This holds for all estimated 
models. The results of the IV regression are qualitatively similar to the OLS results, but the 
coefficients are larger in magnitude. Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. 
summarizes the findings of the relationship between the microfinance proxies of financial 
development (MFIC and MFIA) and the poverty measures. 































































Observations 290 289 290 288 288 288 
# of group 44 43 44 43 43 43 
R-squared 0.839 0.830 0.471 0.472 0.432 0.432 
Sargan-Hansen 0.482 0.408 0.286 0.415 0.0733 0.0817 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses 
 



































































Observations 329 328 335 334 329 328 
# of group 45 45 46 46 45 45 
r-squared  0.820 0.819 0.512 0.511 0.5614 0.5667 
Sargan-Hansen 0.0816 0.0542 0.900 0.465 0.080 0.091 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses 
 
The results in Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. show that microfinance credit 
(MFIC) reduces multidimensional poverty, which is statistically significant at 1%. The results 
show that a 10% increase in the gross loan portfolio of microfinance institutions can reduce 
multidimensional poverty by 5.1%. We also find a negative relationship between microfinance 
assets (MFIA) and multidimensional poverty, suggesting that a 10% rise in microfinance assets 
can reduce poverty by 3%. This finding is supported by evidence from Hadj Miled and Ben Rejeb 
(2018) and Khandker (2005), implying that providing financial access for the poor through 
microfinance institutions may help substantially alleviate all dimensions of poverty. Improved 
access to finance may lead to a long-lasting increase in income to cushion investments in income-
generating activities and improve the lives of the poor. As far as headcount poverty and the 
poverty gap are concerned, we find no statistically significant relationship with MFIC and MFIA. 
Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. reports the estimation results of the traditional 
financial development indicators (PCREDIT and BASSET) against all measures of poverty. We 
find a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between the multidimensional poverty 
index and the two proxies of the traditional finance indicators. However, the results show that a 
10% increase in private credit (PCREDIT) worsens headcount poverty and the poverty gap by 
2.29% and 2.17%, respectively. These results are significant at the 10% and 5% levels. In addition, 
we find that a 10% rise in bank assets (BASSET) increases the poverty gap by 1.62%. Although we 
find a positive relationship between headcount poverty and bank assets (BASSET), this result is 
not statistically significant. For a further robustness check of our findings, we estimate a two-step 
system GMM, taking into consideration the dynamic nature of our panel data and country-
specific effects. Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. and Errore. L'origine 
riferimento non è stata trovata. report the results. 
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Observations 292 292 189 190 189 190 
AR1 0.009 0.009 0.049 0.049 0.031 0.032 
AR2 0.670 0.697 0.572 0.605 0.699 0.809 
# of instruments 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Hansen 0.458 0.535 0.956 0.960 0.916 0.917 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses 
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Observations 335 334 216 215 216 215 
AR1 0.008 0.007 0.061 0.057 0.028 0.043 
AR2 0.974 0.867 0.599 0.605 0.797 0.807 
Hansen 0.506 0.453 0.853 0.867 0.899 0.864 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses 
 
In Columns 1 and 2 of Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata., the estimates show a 
negative relationship between our multidimensional poverty index and microfinance credit 
(MFIC). We also find negative association between the multidimensional poverty index and 
microfinance assets (MFIA) These results are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels. 
These results confirm our estimates from the OLS and 2SLS regressions. We also find evidence of 
a positive relationship between the headcount poverty index and the microfinance measures of 
financial development (MFIC and MFIA) but not statistically significant. In column 5, the estimate 
of microfinance credit (MFIC) is negative but not statistically significant. In column 6, the estimate 
between microfinance assets (MFIA) and poverty gap is negative and significant at the 5% level, 
indicating a 10% increase in microfinance assets has a poverty-reducing effect of 1.45%. These 
results strengthen the importance of microfinance institutions as agents of change in the fight 
against poverty in developing economies. Thus, providing non-collateral loans at lower interest 
rates may reinforce the importance of microfinance in reducing poverty. These findings are 
consistent with evidence from Hadj Miled and Ben Rejeb (2018) and Inoue and Hamori (2013) 
and also support the poverty lending approach (Robinson, 2001). In Errore. L'origine riferimento 
non è stata trovata., however, our results provide show negative relationship between the 
traditional indicators of financial development and the multidimensional poverty index but not 
the headcount poverty and poverty gap indices. These are significant at 5% level. However, the 
magnitude of the impact of smaller than the resulting magnitude from that of the microfinance 
indicators. We find a no dependence between the traditional financial development indicators 
and the other two poverty measures. Comparatively, the results so far confirm the poverty-
reducing effect of microfinance institutions in developing economies. These results are consistent 
with earlier studies such as Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2002, 2005), Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011), 
and Sehrawat and Giri (2016). The insignificant effect of traditional financial development 
indicators on the multidimensional poverty index and headcount poverty is not especially 
surprising; as argued by Copestake et al. (2005), the “better off” poor benefit more from financial 
institutions compared to the core poor. This may be attributed to issues of borrowing constraints 
from the client's side (Banerjee et al., 2015; Banerjee & Jackson, 2016) and the targeting approach 
of banking institutions in developing economies, as argued in Kondo et al. (2008) and Nawaz 
(2010). 
 Given this assertion of Copestake et al. (2005), we investigated further the impact of some 
of the social performance  activities of the microfinance institutions on  poverty reduction. Three 
aspects are investigated in this study namely (i) social goals that target women, rural financing, 
and child education and provide youth opportunities. (ii)  development goals that provide access 
to finance, target gender and women empowerment and poverty reduction. (iii) poverty 
reduction effects that target low-income earners and very poor clients. the results are reported in 
Table 3. 10. Comparatively, we find that although microfinance institutions appear to 
have negative effect on poverty reduction, their performance is only evident in access to finance. 
Thus, it is only the relationship between access to finance and all the poverty measures that 
appear to be negative. All other social performance indicators are positively correlated with the 
poverty variables. The implication of this findings show that it is only the financial accessibility 
that contributes to poverty reduction but not the other social performance goals. Although it may 
appear surprising but one factor that can contribute to this is the motivation for the establishment 
of the institution. If the motive is for-profit then we do not expect that such a microfinance 
institution will be concerned with poverty reduction or targeting poor or low-income earners.   
 3.5 Concluding Remarks 
This study empirically examined the finance - poverty relationship for 49 developing countries 
using alternative measures of poverty and financial development. Employing a fixed-effects 2SLS 
and dynamic panel estimation technique on a panel data covering the period 2000 to 2017, our 
results suggest that the impact of financial development on poverty depends on the measures of 
poverty and financial development indicators. Specifically, we find that all the alternative 
financial development indicators employed in the models are negatively correlated with the 
multidimensional poverty index; only the microfinance proxies of financial development appear 
to have a strong impact. After replacing the multidimensional poverty index with the headcount 
poverty ratio, the impact of financial development appears to be statistically insignificant with 
traditional banking indicators, but not the microfinance indicators. A further investigation also 
revealed that it is access to finance, the only social performance goal, that has negative impact on 
poverty reduction. 
Our findings provide important insights and implications for policy. We conclude that 
policymakers need to steer financial system development to engender pro-poor poverty 
reduction via microfinance institutions. Specifically, we argue that governments in developing 
economies should build an inclusive financial system where there is effective access to a wide 
range of appropriate financial products and services for the entrepreneurial poor by 
mainstreaming microfinance in the banking sector. This will help the socially excluded or the 
poor to also benefit from the opportunities that accrue from improved financial intermediation 
and financial inclusion. It is important for policymakers to develop effective regulatory systems 
for financial institutions, as well as enhance the financial infrastructure. Lessons can be learned 
from the policy framework that led to the success story of the rural banking industry across the 
developing world. This can help streamline or strengthen the operations of microfinance 
institutions to further stimulate poverty reduction. Example of this policy is the two-tier 
supervision of the rural banking industry in Ghana.  
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Appendix 3. 1: Definition of variables 
Variables Definition Source 
Multidimensional Poverty Normalized index of poverty based on a principal 
component score of health, education, and living 
standard. 
Authors calculation 
Headcount ($1.90 a day) Is the percentage of the population living on less than 
$1.90 a day at 2015 PPP 
WDI 
Poverty gap ($1.90 a day) Is the mean shortfall from the poverty line expressed 
as a percentage of the poverty line 
WDI 
Per capita GDP GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international $) WDI 
Gini An index of income inequality, an index of 0 denotes 
egalitarian income distribution and an index of 100 
implies perfect inequality 
WDI 
Government spending General government final consumption expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
WDI 




MFI asset (% of GDP) Measured by the deposits, defined as a % of GDP Market information 
exchange International 
Private credit (% of GDP) Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%) Cihák et al. (2012) 
Bank asset (% of GDP) Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%) Cihák et al. (2012) 
Credit market regulations Measures the extent to which credit is allocated 
between the government and private sector 
Fraser Institute 
Rule of law Measures the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. The 
score ranges between -2.5 and +2.5 
WBGI 
Ethnic Fractionalization Reflects a combination of racial and linguistic 
characteristics of a group. 
Alesina et al. (2003)/ The 
Quality of Governance 
Institute 
Language Fractionalization Reflects the probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country will not belong to the 
same linguistic group. 
Alesina et al. (2003)/ The 
Quality of Governance 
Institute 
Religious Fractionalization Reflects the probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country will not belong to the 
same religious group.  
Alesina et al. (2003)/ The 






Appendix 3.2: Summary of descriptive statistics of multi-dimensional poverty variables  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Unimproved sanitation 882 22.40 21.88 0.00 79.90 
Unimproved drinking water 882 15.96 14.69 0.00 62.30 
Mean years of schooling 882 6.14 2.61 1.10 11.80 
Population without access to electricity 882 36.74 33.39 0.00 96.35 
Population without access to clean cooking fuel 882 60.89 33.27 0.94 99.85 
Prevalence of undernourishment (% of pop.) 882 16.89 10.59 0.00 55.50 
Per capita household consumption expenditure 882 1659.54 1432.33 207.28 6695.60 
Child between 4 - 14 mortality 882 13.00 11.37 1.28 62.84 
Child under 5 mortality 882 62.12 46.11 8.97 233.98 





Table 3. 10: Random effect estimates of Microfinance institutions social performance and Poverty 
 Multidimensional Poverty Headcount Poverty Poverty Gap 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
































































































































































Observations 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 988 988 988 988 988 988 988 988 
Wald test 67.76*** 127.6*** 30.68*** 186.6*** 17.70*** 67.83*** 11.01*** 86.66*** 18.74*** 53.51*** 9.457*** 68.67*** 
within R-squared 0.0385 0.0723 0.0170 0.103 0.0342 0.0967 0.0156 0.132 0.0371 0.0781 0.0140 0.110 
     Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conclusion and Thoughts on Future Research  
The discourse on poverty and inequality is an important subject matter in the development economics 
literature and the “Global South” in particular. The entirety of the dissertation contributes to poverty 
and income inequality literature by arguing on the impact of economic spillovers, institutional change 
and financial development.  
In this dissertation, we estimated the impact of entrepreneurship and innovation by examining 
the effect of spillovers on income inequality in developing countries. We applied spatial panel 
regression models to address potential issues of spatial dependency and spillover effects among 
neighboring countries. The empirical results indicated that innovation is significant in widening 
income inequality, especially for high income countries. A positive innovation-inequality dependence 
is only possible if we measure entrepreneurial activity by new business density. The findings also 
demonstrate that the effect of entrepreneurial activity on income inequality in middle and low income 
differs depending on the proxy used. While we find evidence of positive nexus between self-
employment and income inequality, the relationship between new business density and income 
inequality is negative. We found positive feedback effect from self-employment, but negative for the 
new business density. In terms of high-income countries, we find no dependence between our self-
employment and income inequality but positive with new business density. Our findings suggest that 
entrepreneurial activities (proxied by new business density) are linked to rising income inequality in 
high income countries. This study also examined whether institutional quality act as mediator in 
influencing the innovation–income inequality or entrepreneurship-income inequality nexus. The 
findings demonstrate that institutional quality act as mediator to increase income inequality in high 
income countries when interacted with innovation but contrary in the middle and low income in the 
model with self-employment. But the model with new business density shows otherwise. The 
interaction effect between institutional quality and entrepreneurial activity is only found to strongly 
reduce income inequality in middle- and low-income countries but not in high income countries.  
Given the prevalence of policy support for institutional change in developing countries, we 
continued our empirical discussion by investigating whether there exists an institutional quality 
threshold effect on income inequality. Since the choice of threshold method is an important debate, 
we adopted a panel threshold model by Kremer et al., (2013) which corrects the limitations of Hansen 
(2000) and Hansen and Caner (2004) threshold models. We estimated the threshold model for 
developing countries and compared our findings with the results on advanced countries. Also, our 
findings suggest that the impact of institutional quality depends on the choice of institutional quality 
indicators. Specifically, using the World Bank Governance indicators we find monotonic relationship 
between institutional quality and income inequality in developing countries but non-linear 
relationship when the International Country Risk Guide measures of institutional quality are used. 
We estimated the threshold effect of the individual institutional quality indicators. For developing 
countries, we found that the impact of institutional quality on income inequality is influenced by 
changes in government effectiveness while the relationship between institutional quality and income 
inequality in the advanced countries is influenced by changes in rule of law.  
We concluded our discussion by examining the impact of financial development on poverty 
alleviation in developing countries. The debate over the role of non-formal financial institutions such 
as microfinance institutions in the financial development process is an important issue in the poverty 
literature. We made our contribution to the relevant finance-poverty literature by investigating the 
sensitivity of the choice of financial development indicators on different poverty measures. We 
constructed a multidimensional poverty measurement that included various aspects of deprivations. 
By conducting a multi-level panel regression, we made a comparative analysis of the impact of 
traditional commercial banks and microfinance institutions on poverty alleviation. Our findings 
demonstrate that the impact of financial development on poverty depends largely on the measures of 
poverty and financial development indicators. Specifically, we find that all the alternative financial 
development indicators employed in the models are negatively correlated with the multidimensional 
poverty index; only the microfinance proxies of financial development appear to have a significant 
impact. After replacing the multidimensional poverty index with the headcount poverty ratio, the 
impact of financial development appears to be statistically insignificant with traditional banking 
indicators, but not the microfinance indicators. We find also that financial development albeit the 
traditional banks appear to worsen poverty, particularly the poverty gap ratio.  
We cannot wave out limitations of this study. In this regard, the focus has been explicitly set 
on broadening the scope of the study by looking at measurement issues and providing country specific 
analysis in the future. Particularly, further extensions to the relationship between innovation and 
income inequality may include exploring other sources of innovation. Our findings used only patent 
applications, it is vital to explore other innovations such as technological upgrading in exports, a 
mixture of trademark and industrial design which are highly sought after in the middle and low 
countries, and innovation in services. Also, exploring how potential sources of research and 
development funding and their performing sectors influence income distribution is very relevant to 
advancing the literature given the significant amount of funds that flow through international co-
operations on technology transfers in middle and low-income countries. This will enrich our 
understanding by providing a more generalized perspective on the motivation for innovation and its 
real impact on income distribution.  
Methodologically, perhaps the most serious limitation is data availability and proxies for 
measuring entrepreneurial activities. Exploring vast aspect of entrepreneurial propensity on 
developing countries may allow for modelling of the endogenous linkages between income inequality 
and entrepreneurial activities over time.  Also, finding a more suitable micro-level data to investigate 
the potential spillover effect of entrepreneurship on income distribution is another direction for future 
research.  A lot of the discussion is about within-country inequality and one potential development 
for future research is to look at within country spatial poverty and inequalities, as both poverty and 
inequality exhibit regional patterns. An examination of the link between entrepreneurship and 
poverty might provide further insight on the entrepreneurship-inequality nexus.  
 
